{
  "abstract": "We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of long quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field, where the effective key length after one signature exposure is the residual dimension $r=n-\\ell$. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classical signature and may jointly process $N$ public-key copies, while verification uses one additional independent copy. We show that, conditioned on the exposed signature, the security problem reduces to a partial-prediction game for a uniform stabilizer ensemble on these $r$ residual qudits, with a partial query along $d=\\operatorname{rank}(Y-Y')$ directions, where $Y$ and $Y'$ denote the honestly signed and target-forged messages, respectively. Surprisingly, although the target requires only partial information, there is no first-order reduction in the required copy rate when $d/r\\toβ\\in(0,1]$. The optimal average forgery probability for the specified target tends to zero for $N/r\\toα<1$ and to one for $α>1$, revealing a sharp threshold at $α=1$. Thus, long stabilizer public keys resist finite-copy forgery attacks under a single-signature-exposure model whenever the adversarial copy rate remains below one.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2609.20877",
  "author_total": 3,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Masahito Hayashi"
    },
    {
      "name": "Jingtian Zhao"
    },
    {
      "name": "Baichu Yu"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/2a4q9khh4e87k.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2609.20877",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "2a4q9khh4e87k",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "LicenseRef-arXiv-nonexclusive-1.0",
  "licence_label": "arXiv licence",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "1702|Quantum Information and Cryptography"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7213921601",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.20877",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-09-22",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/2a4q9khh4e87k.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:23:39Z",
      "native_id": "2609.20877",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "physics",
      "origin": "arxiv:quant-ph",
      "subfield": "quantum"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks",
  "title_text": "Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:23:39Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/2a4q9khh4e87k",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}