{
  "abstract": "Fifty-seven years of debate have not led to a consensus on Newcomb's problem. I argue that this failure comes from not viewing the problem in concrete terms, for which common-sense intuitions are clearly applicable. If near-perfect predictions are not required - only predictions good enough that Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) recommends taking only one box - Newcomb scenarios without any fantastic elements are actually feasible. I give a detailed account of such concrete scenarios, in which the decision-maker has varying amounts of information about the prediction process. I argue that in these scenarios it is rational to take both boxes, as Causal Decision Theory (CDT) recommends. To make this more convincing, I introduce a simpler impersonal Newcomb problem, also with a concrete realization, to help bridge causal intuitions from everyday decisions to the standard Newcomb scenario. I also argue that Newcomb's problem with nearly perfect predictions can only be realized by a (currently fantastic) process in which the Predictor accurately simulates the thoughts of a Participant. In a functionalist view of consciousness, this simulation will be a conscious entity, whose experience will not be distinguishable from that of a ``real'' person. In this scenario, CDT recommends taking one box. I conclude that when Newcomb's problem is properly analysed in concrete terms, CDT gives the correct answer in all scenarios.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2608.28825",
  "author_total": 1,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Radford M. Neal"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3he7swda581x4.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2608.28825",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "3he7swda581x4",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28825",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "stat.OT"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "1800|Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7204936519",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.28825",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-08-28",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3he7swda581x4.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:17:54Z",
      "native_id": "2608.28825",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28825"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "arxiv:stat.OT",
      "subfield": "statistics"
    }
  ],
  "title": "When to take one box, when to take two: A concrete analysis of Newcomb's problem",
  "title_text": "When to take one box, when to take two: A concrete analysis of Newcomb's problem",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:17:54Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3he7swda581x4",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}