{
  "abstract": "Public blockchains can make many trading venues simultaneously visible and mechanically reachable, yet an order still has to pay to activate each additional venue: technological connectivity need not translate into economically integrated execution. Automated-market-maker (AMM) pools make this gap directly measurable, because exact pre-trade venue states, transaction-level routing costs, and realized venue use can be reconstructed jointly from public blockchain records. Using 13,768 sampled family-transactions from 29 Ethereum and Base token-pair families and 71 sibling pools, we document a sharp compression from gross to net execution opportunity: the equal-chain lower bound on gross multi-venue gains is 34.85%, while the corresponding upper bound after measured access costs is 6.89%, as access costs eliminate 80.45% of point-identified states with positive gross gains. Realized routing shows a distinct second contrast: actual multi-pool activation occurs in only 1.203% of the opportunity population, yet among 170 eligible realized integrated routes, observed allocation captures 94.8% of aggregate feasible gain. Holding recipient orders and exact venue states fixed, replacing the Ethereum routing-cost regime with Base's lower-cost regime materially expands executable integration under both state populations. For digital-market design, the results imply that blockchain scaling, cross-venue connectivity, and displayed liquidity do not by themselves establish economically integrated execution: integration is an order-specific property that depends on transaction-level access costs.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2609.19013",
  "author_total": 1,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Wen-Ting Wang"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3hj6jkyjm17gj.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2609.19013",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "3hj6jkyjm17gj",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19013",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "q-fin.ST"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "stat.CO"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": null,
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.19013",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-09-17",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3hj6jkyjm17gj.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:22:29Z",
      "native_id": "2609.19013",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19013"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "arxiv:stat.CO",
      "subfield": "statistics"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Routing Frictions and Executable Liquidity in Fragmented Markets",
  "title_text": "Routing Frictions and Executable Liquidity in Fragmented Markets",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:22:29Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/3hj6jkyjm17gj",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}