{
  "abstract": "Self-control problems affect consumption, saving, and labor supply, with implications for tax policy. We study optimal taxation with the self-control preferences of Gul and Pesendorfer. Krusell et al. showed that with these preferences, savings should be subsidized; under logarithmic utility, they showed that the subsidy should rise with age. We extend their analysis by adding a labor–leisure choice and comparing investment, capital income, consumption, and labor income taxes. When temptation applies to the consumption–leisure bundle, a single investment or capital income subsidy corrects both the consumption and the leisure margins in partial equilibrium, whereas consumption taxes require a matching labor tax adjustment. Non-separability between consumption and leisure does not change this requirement. With inelastic labor, the same subsidy rates implement the commitment allocation in a two-period general equilibrium model. In a logarithmic T-period partial equilibrium model with elastic labor, the same subsidy formulas and age profile hold under an interior menu condition. In a calibrated example with annual periods, implementing the commitment allocation raises welfare by about 7 percent of consumption in the baseline. The gain varies widely across empirically plausible degrees of present bias.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [
    "Research School of Economics, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia",
    "Graduate School of Development Economics (GSDE), National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), 148 Serithai Road, Klong-Chan, Bangkapi, Bangkok 10240, Thailand"
  ],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": null,
  "author_total": 2,
  "authors": [
    {
      "affs": [
        0
      ],
      "name": "Cagri Seda Kumru",
      "orcid": "0000-0002-7158-6243"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        1
      ],
      "name": "Saran Sarntisart",
      "orcid": "0000-0001-5770-0540"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/5zvgddrcs5n7f.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.3390/math14203727",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "5zvgddrcs5n7f",
  "issns": [
    "2227-7390"
  ],
  "landing_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3727",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": null,
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "openalex",
      "2002|Economic and Fiscal Studies"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W645685586",
  "pdf_url": null,
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-14",
  "publisher": "MDPI AG",
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/5zvgddrcs5n7f.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:18:29Z",
      "native_id": "10.3390/math14203727",
      "source": "crossref",
      "url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3727"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "issn:2227-7390",
      "subfield": "general"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Optimal Taxation in Lifecycle Economies in the Presence of Commitment and Temptation Problems",
  "title_text": "Optimal Taxation in Lifecycle Economies in the Presence of Commitment and Temptation Problems",
  "type": "peer-reviewed",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:18:29Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/5zvgddrcs5n7f",
  "venue": "Mathematics",
  "versions": []
}