{
  "abstract": "Induction shapes consciousness science as researchers infer experience, generalizing neural signatures, and project across contexts. While deduction sets ideals of certainty, induction guides experimentation and decision-making. This article provides a synoptic analysis of induction’s role in consciousness science by surveying its philosophical background, from Aristotle and Hume to Popper, Salmon, and Peirce, and its formalization in Bayesian and predictive-processing frameworks. This manuscript then examines how induction operates across neuroimaging, comparative cognition, and clinical contexts, highlighting successes (pattern detection, anesthesia monitoring, covert awareness detection) and structural risks (correlation–causation slippage, overgeneralization, anthropomorphism, and high-stakes misclassification). Recent sufficiency-oriented syntheses (e.g., Coppola, 2025; Mashour et al., 2020; Hohwy et al., 2020) exemplify both the power and the perils of inductive generalization, extending correlational findings into claims of ontological sufficiency. Building on recent critiques and adversarial comparisons of leading theories, this article argues for an explicitly deflationary program that keeps induction indispensable but bounded. The core tools are: (i) operational vocabularies distinguishing constructs (access, arousal, valuation, metacognition); (ii) transparent bridge principles linking observables to experiences; and (iii) prediction tables that register both positive predictions and falsifiers. This pragmatic framework does not solve Hume’s problem; it makes our inductive commitments tractable, testable, and ethically responsible. Consciousness science should remain inductive, just not inflationary. To demonstrate this framework’s tractability, the paper introduces examples of bridge principles and quantitative criteria for “bounded” inference, including Bayesian priors, model-comparison metrics, and causal graphs. Ethical and institutional dimensions are expanded to include AI, animal, and algorithmic induction. These additions link philosophical modesty with methodological implementation and moral accountability.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": null,
  "author_total": 3,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Matthew Phillip Gunn"
    },
    {
      "name": "Christine C. Minton"
    },
    {
      "name": "Chienyem A. Nweke"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/636m3c0q48xkb.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.31234/osf.io/bf3ue_v2",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "636m3c0q48xkb",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/bf3ue_v2/",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": null,
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "bepress",
      "Neuroscience"
    ],
    [
      "bepress",
      "Psychiatry"
    ],
    [
      "bepress",
      "Social and Behavioral Sciences"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "3205|Philosophy and Theoretical Science"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7223245945",
  "pdf_url": "https://osf.io/bf3ue/download",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-22",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/636m3c0q48xkb.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:19:40Z",
      "native_id": "bf3ue",
      "source": "osf",
      "url": "https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/bf3ue_v2/"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "biology",
      "origin": "bepress:Neuroscience",
      "subfield": "neuroscience"
    },
    {
      "field": "medicine",
      "origin": "bepress:Psychiatry",
      "subfield": "psychiatry"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Induction and Overreach in the Science of Consciousness",
  "title_text": "Induction and Overreach in the Science of Consciousness",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:19:40Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/636m3c0q48xkb",
  "venue": "PsyArXiv",
  "versions": []
}