{
  "abstract": "Regulatory instruments alter institutional payoffs, but they do not choose which equilibrium a decentralized financial system will realize. A policy that appears safe at one computed response can therefore coexist with an unobserved fire-sale or funding-run outcome. We pose policy construction as a set-containment requirement: every approximate Nash equilibrium of the regulated game must remain inside a buffered stability target. EquiImplement enforces this requirement with state-dependent mixtures of admissible unilateral deviations over the target complement. When policy features enter payoffs affinely, holding this proof object fixed gives affine inequalities in the regulatory vector and a concave minimum margin, producing a convex semi-infinite policy subproblem. A rigorous regional separator locates the weakest-covered state, and the same verified counterexample drives both the next policy solve and certificate revision. A preset outer-iteration budget gives finite execution and one of three outputs: globally certified containment, budget infeasibility within the prescribed incentive–certificate family, or an unresolved status. The evaluation covers 330 fire-sale and rollover/run games. At the default budget, EquiImplement attains full-stability rates of 95.0%, 85.6%, and 92.5%, while reducing the worst-equilibrium violation from 0.037 for the strongest non-oracle baseline to 0.016. The mean regulatory cost over returned budget-feasible evaluation policies decreases from 0.119 to 0.113. Further analyses relate certification difficulty to stability-target tightness, leverage, market depth, liquidity buffers, and coordination strength. The results show that a deviation-based proof object can serve directly as an optimization interface for financial regulation under equilibrium multiplicity.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [
    "Binary Business School, Binary University of Management & Entrepreneurship, Puchong 47100, Malaysia",
    "Graduate School of Information, Production and Systems, Waseda University, Kitakyushu 808-0135, Japan",
    "School of Intelligent Manufacturing and Electrical Engineering, Xinjiang College of Science & Technology, Korla 841000, China",
    "Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan"
  ],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": null,
  "author_total": 7,
  "authors": [
    {
      "affs": [
        0
      ],
      "name": "Jinjia Chen"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        1
      ],
      "name": "Yulun Chen"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        1
      ],
      "name": "Kun Yang",
      "orcid": "0009-0005-2500-3907"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        1
      ],
      "name": "Xingyu Zhou"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        2
      ],
      "name": "Yingchao Wang",
      "orcid": "0000-0002-7945-1212"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        1
      ],
      "name": "Feng Xue",
      "orcid": "0009-0008-0501-2824"
    },
    {
      "affs": [
        3
      ],
      "name": "Tianfu Li"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/90yrsjhsyq7z6.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.3390/math14203835",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "90yrsjhsyq7z6",
  "issns": [
    "2227-7390"
  ],
  "landing_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3835",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": null,
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "openalex",
      "2003|Banking stability, regulation, efficiency"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7223179836",
  "pdf_url": null,
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-21",
  "publisher": "MDPI AG",
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/90yrsjhsyq7z6.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:18:29Z",
      "native_id": "10.3390/math14203835",
      "source": "crossref",
      "url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3835"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "issn:2227-7390",
      "subfield": "general"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Regulating All Induced Equilibria: Counterexample-Coupled Incentive–Certificate Synthesis for Financial Stability",
  "title_text": "Regulating All Induced Equilibria: Counterexample-Coupled Incentive–Certificate Synthesis for Financial Stability",
  "type": "peer-reviewed",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:18:29Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/90yrsjhsyq7z6",
  "venue": "Mathematics",
  "versions": []
}