{
  "abstract": "Status updates let a receiver track a changing process, but a sender that controls when they are sent can steer the receiver's estimate without misreporting. We study competition between two such senders with opposing preferences, who report on a binary continuous-time Markov chain using state-dependent Poisson rates under individual budgets. The receiver follows the reports through a zero-order-hold estimator only if this yields at least the long-run weighted correct-estimation utility of a prior-based default estimate. We model the interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the sender favored by this default leads, the opposing sender follows, and the receiver then selects its estimator. We characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in closed form. When the follower can obtain positive utility against a silent leader, limited state-$0$ reporting by the leader merely frees part of the follower's budget for state-$1$ reports, so every optimal leader policy is either silence or full-budget state-$0$ reporting, depending on explicit budget thresholds. A single sender with the same total budget leaves the receiver at its default utility, whereas the full-budget intervention outcome makes the receiver's participation constraint slack and strictly improves its utility. At the intervention threshold, silence and full-budget intervention yield identical sender payoffs but different receiver utilities. Numerical results illustrate these regimes and compare equilibrium performance with a receiver-optimal reporting benchmark.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2610.04468",
  "author_total": 2,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Ahmet Bugra Gundogan"
    },
    {
      "name": "Melih Bastopcu"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9pmsjzenm4s7v.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2610.04468",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "9pmsjzenm4s7v",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "LicenseRef-arXiv-nonexclusive-1.0",
  "licence_label": "arXiv licence",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.GT"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.IT"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.NI"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.SY"
    ],
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      "arxiv",
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    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "eess.SY"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "math.IT"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "1803|Game Theory and Applications"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7220727425",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.04468",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-03",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9pmsjzenm4s7v.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:27:10Z",
      "native_id": "2610.04468",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04468"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "arxiv:math.IT",
      "subfield": "general"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver?",
  "title_text": "Timely Persuasion with Opposing Senders: When Does Competition Help the Receiver?",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:27:10Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9pmsjzenm4s7v",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}