{
  "abstract": "Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector $α= A\\,e(m)$ and each verifier holds a secret functional $c_i = Γ^T λ(x_i)$ derived from virtual anchors $Γ$ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to $ω$ verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most $Q/q + 1/(q-1)$, a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for $t < n/3$, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size $32(ω+1)$ bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on $n$. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2610.31814",
  "author_total": 3,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Khadijeh Bagheri"
    },
    {
      "name": "Hassan Khodaiemehr"
    },
    {
      "name": "Chen Feng"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9v0gp288r4cjr.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2610.31814",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "9v0gp288r4cjr",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY-NC-ND 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.DC"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.IT"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "math.IT"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "1702|Cryptography and Data Security"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7223656261",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.31814",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-22",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9v0gp288r4cjr.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:35:15Z",
      "native_id": "2610.31814",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.31814"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "arxiv:math.IT",
      "subfield": "general"
    },
    {
      "field": "physics",
      "origin": "arxiv:quant-ph",
      "subfield": "quantum"
    }
  ],
  "title": "SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains",
  "title_text": "SILMARILS-MV: Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Verifier Signatures with Dealer-Free Key Issuance and Linear Aggregation for Permissioned Blockchains",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:35:19Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/9v0gp288r4cjr",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}