{
  "abstract": "An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy that, once adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any sufficiently rare alternative (mutant) strategy. We analyse evolutionary stability in an Eisert--Wilkens--Lewenstein (EWL) quantization of a symmetric $2\\times2$ coordination game, whose classical mixed equilibrium $p^*=1/2$ is not an ESS. In the restricted two-parameter EWL strategy space, the corresponding quantum strategy is a strict symmetric Nash equilibrium and an ESS for every entanglement strength $γ>0$. In the full $SU(2)$ strategy space it remains a Nash equilibrium, but in the unreduced game, in which every unitary is a distinct strategy, exact payoff duplicates preclude strictness and ESS for every pure strategy. For the agreement-payoff class, the payoff factors through a Bloch map; identifying payoff-equivalent unitaries gives the reduced space $U(1)\\backslash SU(2)\\cong S^2$, where strictness and ESS are restored for $γ>0$. An arbitrarily small perturbation outside this class that preserves $p^*=1/2$ yields a profitable deviation, so the reduced-space result is not generic.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": "Journal reference: Quantum Information Processing, Volume 25, article number 348 (2026)",
  "arxiv": "2607.21103",
  "author_total": 2,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Azhar Iqbal"
    },
    {
      "name": "Derek Abbott"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/eajzr6pfrfp43.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2607.21103",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "eajzr6pfrfp43",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21103",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "LicenseRef-arXiv-nonexclusive-1.0",
  "licence_label": "arXiv licence",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "quant-ph"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": null,
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.21103",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-14",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/eajzr6pfrfp43.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:35:35Z",
      "native_id": "2607.21103",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21103"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "physics",
      "origin": "arxiv:quant-ph",
      "subfield": "quantum"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Evolutionary stability and payoff equivalence in an Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game",
  "title_text": "Evolutionary stability and payoff equivalence in an Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:35:35Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/eajzr6pfrfp43",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": [
    {
      "doi": "10.1007/s11128-026-05373-0",
      "pid": null,
      "relation": "published-as",
      "title": null,
      "venue": null
    }
  ]
}