{
  "abstract": "Formal verification of power side-channel leakage and its countermeasures in cryptographic algorithms is challenging, as SAT-based methods fail to scale on XOR-heavy, time-unrolled cryptographic circuits with realistic leakage models. We construct compact Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) cases modeling one-bit leakage under two-trace conditions, linking key dependence and state evolution. Classical solvers quickly reach complexity limits, so we propose Q-LEAK, a quantum-based verification approach using Grover's algorithm, compiling each CNF into an oracle and applying amplitude amplification to search in O(sqrt(N)) oracle calls, with oracles that encode the two-trace leakage predicate and the CNF constraints. Benchmarking against classical SAT shows both potential gains and practical resource limits. In noiseless tests on 5-7 variable benchmarks, Q-LEAK consistently recovered a satisfying assignment within 1-4 tries, with marked bitstrings amplified clearly above the background distribution, exceeding 20 percent probability. The evaluation of Q-LEAK on real quantum hardware revealed at least one classically verified SAT assignment, despite the presence of noise. These results point to a potential path toward quantum-assisted verification of side-channel protections.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2605.25728",
  "author_total": 3,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Walid El Maouaki"
    },
    {
      "name": "Alberto Marchisio"
    },
    {
      "name": "Muhammad Shafique"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/ez3rw4536vs03.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2605.25728",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "ez3rw4536vs03",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25728",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "LicenseRef-arXiv-nonexclusive-1.0",
  "licence_label": "arXiv licence",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "quant-ph"
    ],
    [
      "openalex",
      "1702|Cryptographic Implementations and Security"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": "W7162460513",
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.25728",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-10-03",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/ez3rw4536vs03.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-10-30T12:27:01Z",
      "native_id": "2605.25728",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25728"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "physics",
      "origin": "arxiv:quant-ph",
      "subfield": "quantum"
    }
  ],
  "title": "Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Side-Channel Countermeasures",
  "title_text": "Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Side-Channel Countermeasures",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-10-30T12:27:01Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/ez3rw4536vs03",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}