{
  "abstract": "Channel state information (CSI) in cellular networks is primarily used to maintain quality of service (QoS), yet it leaks privacy-sensitive information, in particular the user equipment's (UE) location. CSI is reported in plaintext on a publicly available schedule; thus, capturing it on the air and using a well trained AI model to localize the UE is straightforward. This simplicity in the attack execution makes it a serious privacy vulnerability. Using conventional privacy enhancing techniques, such as additive perturbation from differential privacy, to protect location data can potentially degrade the downlink communication quality. We present HideOut, a client-side defense mechanism that preserves the user's location from neural-based localization methods, while maintaining their downlink Spectral Efficiency (SE). Unlike generic adversarial attacks, HideOut treats downlink SE as a strict constraint in an optimization setting. Under maximum ratio transmission (MRT) beamforming, we show that a user-selected SE loss budget can be converted into an angular rate-feasible constraint on the reported channel vector. HideOut then performs gradient-based localization obfuscation while projecting each update onto this rate-feasible set. We evaluate HideOut against four CSI-based localization architectures under both white-box and black-box assumptions. Across models, HideOut increases localization ambiguity (error) from approximately $1--2$ m to $72--85$ m while keeping downlink SE loss within a $1\\%$ budget. These results show that CSI-based localization can be substantially degraded at negligible communication quality loss when adversarial perturbations are made aware of the wireless link.",
  "abstract_shown": true,
  "affiliations": [],
  "article_type": null,
  "arxiv": "2611.00088",
  "author_total": 4,
  "authors": [
    {
      "name": "Navidreza Asadi"
    },
    {
      "name": "Michele Guardiani"
    },
    {
      "name": "Wolfgang Kellerer"
    },
    {
      "name": "Jafar Aco Mohammadi"
    }
  ],
  "bibtex": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/fc6svzq2cmw2d.bib",
  "cited_by": 0,
  "doi": "10.48550/arxiv.2611.00088",
  "fulltext_url": null,
  "id": "fc6svzq2cmw2d",
  "issns": [],
  "landing_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088",
  "language": null,
  "licence": "CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0",
  "licence_label": "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0",
  "licence_source": "article",
  "licence_url": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/",
  "metadata_licence": "CC0-1.0",
  "native_subjects": [
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.CR"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "cs.IT"
    ],
    [
      "arxiv",
      "math.IT"
    ]
  ],
  "openalex": null,
  "pdf_url": "https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.00088",
  "pmcid": null,
  "pmid": null,
  "published": "2026-11-01",
  "publisher": null,
  "ris": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/fc6svzq2cmw2d.ris",
  "sources": [
    {
      "first_seen": "2026-11-03T12:21:10Z",
      "native_id": "2611.00088",
      "source": "arxiv",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00088"
    }
  ],
  "subjects": [
    {
      "field": "mathematics",
      "origin": "arxiv:math.IT",
      "subfield": "general"
    }
  ],
  "title": "HideOut - User Protection Against Localization with Throughput Guarantees in Mobile Networks",
  "title_text": "HideOut - User Protection Against Localization with Throughput Guarantees in Mobile Networks",
  "type": "preprint",
  "updated_at": "2026-11-05T15:20:22Z",
  "url": "https://research.draconitic.com/paper/fc6svzq2cmw2d",
  "venue": "arXiv",
  "versions": []
}