Scientific Promise
Abstract
Scientists constantly face decisions about what lines of research to pursue. This Element introduces the philosophical debate about scientific pursuitworthiness. It explains how it can be rational to pursue a theory even if the theory is less well supported than its rivals, and it discusses existing philosophical frameworks for guiding pursuit decisions. The Element also develops a new perspective. Existing accounts focus predominantly on theories, while experiments are largely neglected. This is an important shortcoming. Theoretical promise depends on experimental promise, and experimental promise raises questions of its own. Drawing on the epistemology of experimentation, the Element advances an account of experimental pursuitworthiness. It is argued that such pursuitworthiness depends on experimental virtues like a clear signal and simplicity of design. Moreover, the kinds of uncertainty that constrain the assessment of scientific pursuits are examined. Finally, the Element highlights open questions in the philosophy of scientific pursuitworthiness.
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BibTeX
@misc{fischer2026scientific,
title = {{Scientific Promise}},
author = {Enno Fischer},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.11267},
eprint = {2609.11267},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11267},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Scientific Promise
AU - Enno Fischer
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/10
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.11267
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11267
AB - Scientists constantly face decisions about what lines of research to pursue. This Element introduces the philosophical debate about scientific pursuitworthiness. It explains how it can be rational to pursue a theory even if the theory is less well supported than its rivals, and it discusses existing philosophical frameworks for guiding pursuit decisions. The Element also develops a new perspective. Existing accounts focus predominantly on theories, while experiments are largely neglected. This is an important shortcoming. Theoretical promise depends on experimental promise, and experimental promise raises questions of its own. Drawing on the epistemology of experimentation, the Element advances an account of experimental pursuitworthiness. It is argued that such pursuitworthiness depends on experimental virtues like a clear signal and simplicity of design. Moreover, the kinds of uncertainty that constrain the assessment of scientific pursuits are examined. Finally, the Element highlights open questions in the philosophy of scientific pursuitworthiness.
ER -