Peer-reviewedCC BY-NC-NDEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Social networks, confirmation bias and shock elections
- 1University of Cambridge and Magdalene College, Cambridge CB3 0AG, UK
- 2Univ. of Cambridge
- 3University of Bristol, England, UK
Abstract
This paper links the increasing prominence of social networks in politics to recent shock election outcomes. In our set-up, agents learning on a network suffer from confirmation bias – the tendency to ignore contrary evidence to one’s own belief. Our main result is that confirmation bias slows down learning in a wide class of networks. For any network, consensus fails to emerge when confirmation bias is above a threshold. We explore the implications for elections and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and encourages media organizations already at the fringe to take on even more extreme views.
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BibTeX
@article{gallo2026social,
title = {{Social networks, confirmation bias and shock elections}},
author = {Edoardo Gallo and Alastair Langtry},
journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102907},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102907},
note = {CC BY-NC-ND},
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
TI - Social networks, confirmation bias and shock elections
AU - Edoardo Gallo
AU - Alastair Langtry
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/12
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102907
UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102907
AB - This paper links the increasing prominence of social networks in politics to recent shock election outcomes. In our set-up, agents learning on a network suffer from confirmation bias – the tendency to ignore contrary evidence to one’s own belief. Our main result is that confirmation bias slows down learning in a wide class of networks. For any network, consensus fails to emerge when confirmation bias is above a threshold. We explore the implications for elections and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and encourages media organizations already at the fringe to take on even more extreme views.
SN - 0176-2680
SN - 1873-5703
ER -