Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks
Abstract
This paper studies physical-layer authentication (PLA) in the near-field regime under impersonation attacks. Unlike the far-field case, where the steering vector depends only on the angle of arrival (AoA), in the near field it depends on both angle and distance. We analyze the attack by minimizing the mean-square error (MSE) between the signal received from a legitimate transmitter Alice and the signal generated by an active attacker Eve. For a single-antenna Eve, we derive the optimal scalar precoder and show that, for an inter-element spacing no larger than half a wavelength and under the standard second-order Fresnel approximation, perfect impersonation is possible only if Eve has the same angle and the same distance from Bob as Alice. We then extend the analysis to a multi-antenna Eve and derive the optimal precoding vector. In this case, perfect impersonation is possible only if Alice steering vector belongs to the subspace spanned by Eve steering vectors. Simulation results show that, in the near field, a distance difference is sufficient to prevent a successful impersonation attack even when Alice and Eve have the same AoA, and confirm the analytical results.
Related
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BibTeX
@misc{hassani2026nearfield,
title = {{Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks}},
author = {Hajar El Hassani and Linda Senigagliesi and Arsenia Chorti},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.04879},
eprint = {2609.04879},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Near-Field Physical-Layer Authentication Under Impersonation Attacks
AU - Hajar El Hassani
AU - Linda Senigagliesi
AU - Arsenia Chorti
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/18
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.04879
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04879
AB - This paper studies physical-layer authentication (PLA) in the near-field regime under impersonation attacks. Unlike the far-field case, where the steering vector depends only on the angle of arrival (AoA), in the near field it depends on both angle and distance. We analyze the attack by minimizing the mean-square error (MSE) between the signal received from a legitimate transmitter Alice and the signal generated by an active attacker Eve. For a single-antenna Eve, we derive the optimal scalar precoder and show that, for an inter-element spacing no larger than half a wavelength and under the standard second-order Fresnel approximation, perfect impersonation is possible only if Eve has the same angle and the same distance from Bob as Alice. We then extend the analysis to a multi-antenna Eve and derive the optimal precoding vector. In this case, perfect impersonation is possible only if Alice steering vector belongs to the subspace spanned by Eve steering vectors. Simulation results show that, in the near field, a distance difference is sufficient to prevent a successful impersonation attack even when Alice and Eve have the same AoA, and confirm the analytical results.
ER -