Skip to content
DraconiticResearch
Search Sources API
203,203 studies31 sourcesUpdated 11 min ago
Peer-reviewedCC BY 4.0Mathematics

Information Disclosure Strategies of Live-Streaming E-Commerce Supply Chains in the AI Era: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

  • Ke Yan1
  • Shaobo Chen1
  • Qi Zhang1
  1. 1Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China
Open at sourceDOICite

Abstract

With the rapid development of live-streaming e-commerce and artificial intelligence, human and AI live-streaming have become two product information disclosure formats in online retail. From the perspective of product information disclosure, we develop a game-theoretic model of a live-streaming e-commerce supply chain comprising a brand owner and an e-commerce platform. We derive Stackelberg equilibria under the resale mode through backward induction, obtain the optimal retail price and information disclosure level under the agency mode through joint optimization, and then compare disclosure-format and sales-mode preferences. The results show that (1) AI live-streaming does not always achieve a higher information disclosure level. It leads to a higher disclosure level only when consumer trust in AI live-streaming disclosure is high, or when trust is moderate and sensitivity to the information disclosure level is low; otherwise, human live-streaming disclosure achieves a higher disclosure level. (2) Under the resale mode, the brand owner and the e-commerce platform have consistent preferences regarding disclosure formats. Both prefer AI live-streaming when consumer trust in AI disclosure is high, or when trust is low but sensitivity is also low, whereas both prefer human live-streaming when trust is low and sensitivity is high. Under the agency mode, their preferences diverge when consumer trust is low and sensitivity is moderate. (3) Regarding sales modes, the brand owner prefers the agency mode only when the commission rate and consumer sensitivity to information disclosure are both low; otherwise, it prefers the resale mode. These findings provide theoretical and managerial implications for disclosure-format selection and sales-mode decisions in live-streaming e-commerce.

Related

  1. Quality Certification and Coopetition in Live-Streaming E-Commerce: A Differential Game with Consumer Reference Effects
    Yongpeng Liu, Fangfang Wei, Andi Xu +1
    MathematicsPeer-reviewedCC BY 4.0General mathematicsCrossref
  2. Measuring Learned Equivariance: An Information Theoretic Approach
    Claire Schlesinger, Wolfgang Gatterbauer, Robin Walters
    arXivPreprintCC BY 4.0Full textGeneral mathematicsarXiv
  3. A Sample-Based Approach for Hierarchical Information-Theoretic Compression of Probabilistic Occupancy Grids
    Zhenyu Jin, Daniel T. Larsson
    arXivPreprintarXiv licenceFull textGeneral mathematicsarXiv
  4. Conditional Fisher-Information Central Limit Theorems under Log-Concavity with Information-Theoretic Consequences
    Tong Ye, Liu-Quan Yao
    arXivPreprintarXiv licenceFull textProbabilityarXiv
  5. Learning Rules, Memorizing Facts: An Information-Theoretic View of Hallucination
    Gengze Xu, Anxin Guo, Yifei Hu +3
    arXivPreprintCC BY 4.0Full textGeneral mathematicsarXiv

Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@article{yan2026information,
  title = {{Information Disclosure Strategies of Live-Streaming E-Commerce Supply Chains in the AI Era: A Game-Theoretic Analysis}},
  author = {Ke Yan and Shaobo Chen and Qi Zhang},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  doi = {10.3390/math14203822},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3822},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Information Disclosure Strategies of Live-Streaming E-Commerce Supply Chains in the AI Era: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
AU  - Ke Yan
AU  - Shaobo Chen
AU  - Qi Zhang
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/20
JO  - Mathematics
DO  - 10.3390/math14203822
UR  - https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/20/3822
AB  - With the rapid development of live-streaming e-commerce and artificial intelligence, human and AI live-streaming have become two product information disclosure formats in online retail. From the perspective of product information disclosure, we develop a game-theoretic model of a live-streaming e-commerce supply chain comprising a brand owner and an e-commerce platform. We derive Stackelberg equilibria under the resale mode through backward induction, obtain the optimal retail price and information disclosure level under the agency mode through joint optimization, and then compare disclosure-format and sales-mode preferences. The results show that (1) AI live-streaming does not always achieve a higher information disclosure level. It leads to a higher disclosure level only when consumer trust in AI live-streaming disclosure is high, or when trust is moderate and sensitivity to the information disclosure level is low; otherwise, human live-streaming disclosure achieves a higher disclosure level. (2) Under the resale mode, the brand owner and the e-commerce platform have consistent preferences regarding disclosure formats. Both prefer AI live-streaming when consumer trust in AI disclosure is high, or when trust is low but sensitivity is also low, whereas both prefer human live-streaming when trust is low and sensitivity is high. Under the agency mode, their preferences diverge when consumer trust is low and sensitivity is moderate. (3) Regarding sales modes, the brand owner prefers the agency mode only when the commission rate and consumer sensitivity to information disclosure are both low; otherwise, it prefers the resale mode. These findings provide theoretical and managerial implications for disclosure-format selection and sales-mode decisions in live-streaming e-commerce.
SN  - 2227-7390
ER  -