Arbitrarily Loss-Tolerant Quantum Position Verification in a Single Execution
Abstract
Quantum position verification (QPV) aims to certify the location of an untrusted prover, but faces two major obstacles: fundamentally, entanglement-based attacks and, experimentally, photon loss. A commitment-based modification introduced in Phys. Rev. Lett. 135, 260801 addresses both in sequentially repeated protocols. Its security analysis, however, relies on the sequential structure and does not extend to parallel repetition. We use a different proof approach to establish security of the commitment modification for a parallel BB84-based QPV protocol. Against bounded-entanglement adversaries, the acceptance probability decays exponentially in the minimum number k of successfully committed qubits. The protocol tolerates arbitrary transmission loss and noise rates up to 3.7%, while allowing arbitrarily slow quantum communication. This yields a fully loss-tolerant, single-execution QPV protocol secure against bounded-entanglement attacks, removing transmission loss as a fundamental limitation on verification distance. We also revisit sequential repetition, correcting the treatment of conditioning on commitment and replacing the earlier conditional guarantee with an unconditional security bound, without the finite-size correction to the correctness gap. The resulting bound provides improved quantitative security parameters for experimental implementations.
Related
- Loss-Tolerant Quantum Position Verification for Metropolitan Area Networks
- Fault-tolerant execution of error-corrected quantum algorithms
- C-Phase-Aware Compilation for Efficient Fault-Tolerant Quantum Execution
- Below-threshold execution of fault-tolerant ripple-carry addition on a trapped-ion quantum computer
- Architecting Instruction Execution for Scalable Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computing
BibTeX
@misc{escolafarras2026arbitrarily,
title = {{Arbitrarily Loss-Tolerant Quantum Position Verification in a Single Execution}},
author = {Llorenç Escolà-Farràs and Boris Škorić and Florian Speelman},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2606.25037},
eprint = {2606.25037},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.25037},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Arbitrarily Loss-Tolerant Quantum Position Verification in a Single Execution
AU - Llorenç Escolà-Farràs
AU - Boris Škorić
AU - Florian Speelman
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/01
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2606.25037
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.25037
AB - Quantum position verification (QPV) aims to certify the location of an untrusted prover, but faces two major obstacles: fundamentally, entanglement-based attacks and, experimentally, photon loss. A commitment-based modification introduced in Phys. Rev. Lett. 135, 260801 addresses both in sequentially repeated protocols. Its security analysis, however, relies on the sequential structure and does not extend to parallel repetition. We use a different proof approach to establish security of the commitment modification for a parallel BB84-based QPV protocol. Against bounded-entanglement adversaries, the acceptance probability decays exponentially in the minimum number k of successfully committed qubits. The protocol tolerates arbitrary transmission loss and noise rates up to 3.7%, while allowing arbitrarily slow quantum communication. This yields a fully loss-tolerant, single-execution QPV protocol secure against bounded-entanglement attacks, removing transmission loss as a fundamental limitation on verification distance. We also revisit sequential repetition, correcting the treatment of conditioning on commitment and replacing the earlier conditional guarantee with an unconditional security bound, without the finite-size correction to the correctness gap. The resulting bound provides improved quantitative security parameters for experimental implementations.
ER -