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Peer-reviewedCC BY 4.0Cognitive Processing

For-me-ness: a critical assessment of the phenomenal mineness thesis

  • Roberto Sá Pereira1
  1. 1Department of Philosophy, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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Abstract

This paper examines the claim that the phenomenal “for-me-ness” is the core feature of every conscious experience. Any conscious episode is intrinsically given as mine, and this mineness, while non-reflective and non-cognitive, belongs to the personal and phenomenal level. The compatibility checks for the for-me-ness thesis comes from cases such as depersonalization, schizophrenia, infancy and autism. I argue that this view lacks evidential support beyond the phenomenological descriptions it was built to interpret and that these phenomena receive better explanations that do not require positing for-me-ness.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@article{pereira2026formeness,
  title = {{For-me-ness: a critical assessment of the phenomenal mineness thesis}},
  author = {Roberto Sá Pereira},
  journal = {Cognitive Processing},
  year = {2026},
  month = aug,
  doi = {10.1007/s10339-026-01383-z},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-026-01383-z},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - For-me-ness: a critical assessment of the phenomenal mineness thesis
AU  - Roberto Sá Pereira
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/08/04
JO  - Cognitive Processing
DO  - 10.1007/s10339-026-01383-z
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-026-01383-z
AB  - This paper examines the claim that the phenomenal “for-me-ness” is the core feature of every conscious experience. Any conscious episode is intrinsically given as mine, and this mineness, while non-reflective and non-cognitive, belongs to the personal and phenomenal level. The compatibility checks for the for-me-ness thesis comes from cases such as depersonalization, schizophrenia, infancy and autism. I argue that this view lacks evidential support beyond the phenomenological descriptions it was built to interpret and that these phenomena receive better explanations that do not require positing for-me-ness.
SN  - 1612-4782
SN  - 1612-4790
ER  -