Distinct neural representations of perceptual and numerical absence in the human brain
Abstract
The ability to represent absences is fundamental to human perception and cognition. Sensitivity to perceptual absences depends on inferring a lack of sensory evidence, enabling the recognition of a lack of environmental resources or other objects. In turn, encoding absence as a concept – in the form of the number zero – has enabled a multitude of technological and mathematical advances. Whether perceptual and conceptual absences rely on overlapping or distinct neural representations in the human brain, however, remains unknown. We employed three different tasks together with magnetoencephalography (MEG) to characterise neural representations of absence evoked within perceptual and numerical domains. Using multivariate decoding and Bayes factor analyses, we replicate previous findings of shared representations of numerical absence across symbolic and non-symbolic formats. In contrast, we show that these representations of numerical absence are distinct to those evoked by perceptual absences. This result held even after controlling for stimulus-level confounds which generate surface-level similarities between perceptual absences and non-symbolic empty sets. Our results extend a boundary between perception and cognition to the domain of absence and provide insight into the different mechanisms employed by the human brain to both perceive and conceive of absences.
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BibTeX
@misc{barnett2026distinct,
title = {{Distinct neural representations of perceptual and numerical absence in the human brain}},
author = {Benjy Barnett and Stephen Fleming},
howpublished = {PsyArXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.31234/osf.io/zyrdk_v4},
url = {https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/zyrdk_v4/},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Distinct neural representations of perceptual and numerical absence in the human brain
AU - Benjy Barnett
AU - Stephen Fleming
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/29
PB - PsyArXiv
DO - 10.31234/osf.io/zyrdk_v4
UR - https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/zyrdk_v4/
AB - The ability to represent absences is fundamental to human perception and cognition. Sensitivity to perceptual absences depends on inferring a lack of sensory evidence, enabling the recognition of a lack of environmental resources or other objects. In turn, encoding absence as a concept – in the form of the number zero – has enabled a multitude of technological and mathematical advances. Whether perceptual and conceptual absences rely on overlapping or distinct neural representations in the human brain, however, remains unknown. We employed three different tasks together with magnetoencephalography (MEG) to characterise neural representations of absence evoked within perceptual and numerical domains. Using multivariate decoding and Bayes factor analyses, we replicate previous findings of shared representations of numerical absence across symbolic and non-symbolic formats. In contrast, we show that these representations of numerical absence are distinct to those evoked by perceptual absences. This result held even after controlling for stimulus-level confounds which generate surface-level similarities between perceptual absences and non-symbolic empty sets. Our results extend a boundary between perception and cognition to the domain of absence and provide insight into the different mechanisms employed by the human brain to both perceive and conceive of absences.
ER -