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Peer-reviewedCC BYNeuroscience of consciousness

The consciousness-first commitment of integrated information theory.

  • Jeremiah Hendren1,2
  1. 1Graduate School Language & Literature, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, Bavaria, 80539 Munich, Germany.
  2. 2Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 6001 Research Park Blvd, Madison, WI 53719, United States.
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Abstract

Integrated information theory (IIT) accounts for consciousness through its explanatory identity: an experience (the explanandum) is identical to a causal structure (or Φ-structure, the explanans). In other identities in science (e.g. 'water is H₂O'), the power of the explanans (H₂O) comes from the presumption that it somehow exists more fundamentally. Yet when our explanandum is experience itself, as in IIT, we must recalibrate the norms of explanation to the fact that experience exists immediately and irrefutably, while whatever we may posit about the world beyond experience is always an inference within experience.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@article{hendren2026consciousnessfirst,
  title = {{The consciousness-first commitment of integrated information theory.}},
  author = {Jeremiah Hendren},
  journal = {Neuroscience of consciousness},
  year = {2026},
  month = nov,
  doi = {10.1093/nc/niag074},
  url = {https://europepmc.org/article/MED/42974390},
  note = {CC BY},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - The consciousness-first commitment of integrated information theory.
AU  - Jeremiah Hendren
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/11/02
JO  - Neuroscience of consciousness
DO  - 10.1093/nc/niag074
UR  - https://europepmc.org/article/MED/42974390
AB  - Integrated information theory (IIT) accounts for consciousness through its explanatory identity: an experience (the explanandum) is identical to a causal structure (or Φ-structure, the explanans). In other identities in science (e.g. 'water is H₂O'), the power of the explanans (H₂O) comes from the presumption that it somehow exists more fundamentally. Yet when our explanandum is experience itself, as in IIT, we must recalibrate the norms of explanation to the fact that experience exists immediately and irrefutably, while whatever we may posit about the world beyond experience is always an inference within experience.
SN  - 2057-2107
ER  -