Risk-minimizing GUE-implementations of truthful reporting in a Dynamic Social Choice Problem

@misc{csoka2026riskminimizing,
  title = {{Risk-minimizing GUE-implementations of truthful reporting in a Dynamic Social Choice Problem}},
  author = {Endre Csóka and Máté Viczián},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.10456},
  eprint = {2610.10456},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10456},
}

TY  - UNPB
TI  - Risk-minimizing GUE-implementations of truthful reporting in a Dynamic Social Choice Problem
AU  - Endre Csóka
AU  - Máté Viczián
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/07
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.10456
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10456
AB  - The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism (GUM) was introduced to implement efficiency in Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE) in dynamic social choice problems. We show that this mechanism also has a previously unknown connection to risk minimization. Fixing an efficient decision policy, we study variance-minimizing budget-balanced transfer rules in the class of GUE-implementations of truthful reporting. A symmetrized version of GUM (sym-GUM) minimizes the sum of the agents' utility variances under truthful reporting when there is no public state. When a public state is present, a slight modification of this rule yields the minimizer for the same objective. Sym-GUM, however, does not minimize transfer risk. The minimizer for that problem is instead the symmetrized version of a closely related GUM-like transfer rule. In both problems, the minimizing truthful total transfers are unique up to agent-specific constants summing to zero and events of probability zero.
ER  -