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PreprintarXiv licencearXiv

Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria

Abstract

This paper studies partially observed mean field games without perfect recall (WPR). The representative agent observes a noisy signal, but the control at time t uses only 𝒒tI=Οƒ(yt), a generally non-nested information family. The conditional population law instead uses the observation filtration 𝔽Y. These coupled levels rely on different information scales and are difficult to close within one construction. We parameterize the environment by a deterministic compatible joint law of state, driving variables, and random mean field term, thereby preserving its dependence structure without enlarging the agent's control information. For a fixed law, a reference measure and Girsanov's theorem yield a WPR stochastic maximum principle; the selected response is represented by the conditional Hamiltonian and WPR belief measure. The joint path posterior of hidden state and mean field term gives a weak Kushner-Stratonovich representation of the conditional population law. A recursive response map is continuous on a compact convex set of compatible laws, so Schauder-Tychonoff yields a weak WPR equilibrium. For a fixed equilibrium law and feedback, a compatible Yamada-Watanabe theorem lifts pathwise uniqueness to a strong realization. Finally, a linear-quadratic interbank lending example compares perfect recall (PR) with WPR. The PR response follows the Kalman-Bucy feedback, whereas the WPR response solves a Fredholm-Volterra equation and is affine in the current observation under Gaussianity. The numerical experiment illustrates how equilibrium behavior differs between PR and WPR.

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BibTeX
@misc{zhang2026partially,
  title = {{Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria}},
  author = {Xuanping Zhang and Xiao Zhang and Wang Yao},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.00880},
  eprint = {2609.00880},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00880},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria
AU  - Xuanping Zhang
AU  - Xiao Zhang
AU  - Wang Yao
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/01
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.00880
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00880
AB  - This paper studies partially observed mean field games without perfect recall (WPR). The representative agent observes a noisy signal, but the control at time t uses only 𝒒_t^I=Οƒ(y_t), a generally non-nested information family. The conditional population law instead uses the observation filtration 𝔽^Y. These coupled levels rely on different information scales and are difficult to close within one construction. We parameterize the environment by a deterministic compatible joint law of state, driving variables, and random mean field term, thereby preserving its dependence structure without enlarging the agent's control information. For a fixed law, a reference measure and Girsanov's theorem yield a WPR stochastic maximum principle; the selected response is represented by the conditional Hamiltonian and WPR belief measure. The joint path posterior of hidden state and mean field term gives a weak Kushner-Stratonovich representation of the conditional population law. A recursive response map is continuous on a compact convex set of compatible laws, so Schauder-Tychonoff yields a weak WPR equilibrium. For a fixed equilibrium law and feedback, a compatible Yamada-Watanabe theorem lifts pathwise uniqueness to a strong realization. Finally, a linear-quadratic interbank lending example compares perfect recall (PR) with WPR. The PR response follows the Kalman-Bucy feedback, whereas the WPR response solves a Fredholm-Volterra equation and is affine in the current observation under Gaussianity. The numerical experiment illustrates how equilibrium behavior differs between PR and WPR.
ER  -