Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria
Abstract
This paper studies partially observed mean field games without perfect recall (WPR). The representative agent observes a noisy signal, but the control at time t uses only π’tI=Ο(yt), a generally non-nested information family. The conditional population law instead uses the observation filtration π½Y. These coupled levels rely on different information scales and are difficult to close within one construction. We parameterize the environment by a deterministic compatible joint law of state, driving variables, and random mean field term, thereby preserving its dependence structure without enlarging the agent's control information. For a fixed law, a reference measure and Girsanov's theorem yield a WPR stochastic maximum principle; the selected response is represented by the conditional Hamiltonian and WPR belief measure. The joint path posterior of hidden state and mean field term gives a weak Kushner-Stratonovich representation of the conditional population law. A recursive response map is continuous on a compact convex set of compatible laws, so Schauder-Tychonoff yields a weak WPR equilibrium. For a fixed equilibrium law and feedback, a compatible Yamada-Watanabe theorem lifts pathwise uniqueness to a strong realization. Finally, a linear-quadratic interbank lending example compares perfect recall (PR) with WPR. The PR response follows the Kalman-Bucy feedback, whereas the WPR response solves a Fredholm-Volterra equation and is affine in the current observation under Gaussianity. The numerical experiment illustrates how equilibrium behavior differs between PR and WPR.
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BibTeX
@misc{zhang2026partially,
title = {{Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria}},
author = {Xuanping Zhang and Xiao Zhang and Wang Yao},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.00880},
eprint = {2609.00880},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00880},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Partially Observed Mean Field Games Without Perfect Recall: Optimality Conditions and Equilibria
AU - Xuanping Zhang
AU - Xiao Zhang
AU - Wang Yao
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/01
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.00880
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00880
AB - This paper studies partially observed mean field games without perfect recall (WPR). The representative agent observes a noisy signal, but the control at time t uses only π’_t^I=Ο(y_t), a generally non-nested information family. The conditional population law instead uses the observation filtration π½^Y. These coupled levels rely on different information scales and are difficult to close within one construction. We parameterize the environment by a deterministic compatible joint law of state, driving variables, and random mean field term, thereby preserving its dependence structure without enlarging the agent's control information. For a fixed law, a reference measure and Girsanov's theorem yield a WPR stochastic maximum principle; the selected response is represented by the conditional Hamiltonian and WPR belief measure. The joint path posterior of hidden state and mean field term gives a weak Kushner-Stratonovich representation of the conditional population law. A recursive response map is continuous on a compact convex set of compatible laws, so Schauder-Tychonoff yields a weak WPR equilibrium. For a fixed equilibrium law and feedback, a compatible Yamada-Watanabe theorem lifts pathwise uniqueness to a strong realization. Finally, a linear-quadratic interbank lending example compares perfect recall (PR) with WPR. The PR response follows the Kalman-Bucy feedback, whereas the WPR response solves a Fredholm-Volterra equation and is affine in the current observation under Gaussianity. The numerical experiment illustrates how equilibrium behavior differs between PR and WPR.
ER -