Does Probability Require a Single History?
Abstract
Everettian quantum mechanics is often said to lack coherent probability because every possible measurement result occurs. If all of them exist globally, what is probability supposed to be a probability of? This paper defends an axiomatic answer: normalized Born measure is postulated as objective probability over the records borne by an observer's future continuations. Collapse interpretations likewise postulate the Born probabilities, but instead assign them to possible global outcomes. Neither theory derives the probabilities from its ontology. The contribution is an explicit record-level probability model that separates probabilities for future local records from certainty about their global existence. I use this model to answer objections to the axiomatic approach and argue that neither global selection nor a further theory of personal persistence is required. At the level of recorded results, the Everettian law supports the same predictions and empirical inferences as the collapse law, despite the theories' different ontologies.
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BibTeX
@misc{baxter2026does,
title = {{Does Probability Require a Single History?}},
author = {Jonathan Baxter},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2608.22733},
eprint = {2608.22733},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22733},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Does Probability Require a Single History?
AU - Jonathan Baxter
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/02
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2608.22733
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22733
AB - Everettian quantum mechanics is often said to lack coherent probability because every possible measurement result occurs. If all of them exist globally, what is probability supposed to be a probability of? This paper defends an axiomatic answer: normalized Born measure is postulated as objective probability over the records borne by an observer's future continuations. Collapse interpretations likewise postulate the Born probabilities, but instead assign them to possible global outcomes. Neither theory derives the probabilities from its ontology. The contribution is an explicit record-level probability model that separates probabilities for future local records from certainty about their global existence. I use this model to answer objections to the axiomatic approach and argue that neither global selection nor a further theory of personal persistence is required. At the level of recorded results, the Everettian law supports the same predictions and empirical inferences as the collapse law, despite the theories' different ontologies.
ER -