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PreprintCC BY 4.0arXiv

On the Construction of Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions with Certifiable Key

Abstract

Trapdoor claw-free functions (TCFs) underpin much of classical-quantum cryptographic interaction, yet every TCF-based protocol states its guarantees relative to an honestly generated key. We give a family-agnostic abstraction of key certification for (noisy) TCF constructions, built on two notions: a certifiable key relation, an NP relation capturing a family's honest keys with witnesses recoverable from the trapdoor; and certified key generation, which emits with each key a certificate of membership satisfying completeness, certificate soundness with extractability, and key privacy. We instantiate certifiable key relations for different constructions, each met generically by a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the relation. As our main application, a generic compiler turns any TCF-based proof of quantumness into a zero-knowledge one, with each security property following from its counterpart in the certification scheme. Finally, we delimit the primitive's reach: for protocols resting on injective invariance, an accepting certificate is itself a family distinguisher, leaking exactly the bit such protocols must hide.

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BibTeX
@misc{lim2026construction,
  title = {{On the Construction of Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions with Certifiable Key}},
  author = {Charles Lim and Yao Ma},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.25819},
  eprint = {2609.25819},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25819},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - On the Construction of Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions with Certifiable Key
AU  - Charles Lim
AU  - Yao Ma
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/22
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.25819
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25819
AB  - Trapdoor claw-free functions (TCFs) underpin much of classical-quantum cryptographic interaction, yet every TCF-based protocol states its guarantees relative to an honestly generated key. We give a family-agnostic abstraction of key certification for (noisy) TCF constructions, built on two notions: a certifiable key relation, an NP relation capturing a family's honest keys with witnesses recoverable from the trapdoor; and certified key generation, which emits with each key a certificate of membership satisfying completeness, certificate soundness with extractability, and key privacy. We instantiate certifiable key relations for different constructions, each met generically by a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for the relation. As our main application, a generic compiler turns any TCF-based proof of quantumness into a zero-knowledge one, with each security property following from its counterpart in the certification scheme. Finally, we delimit the primitive's reach: for protocols resting on injective invariance, an accepting certificate is itself a family distinguisher, leaking exactly the bit such protocols must hide.
ER  -