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PreprintCC BY 4.0arXiv

Monopolist nonlinear pricing in a seller's market

  • Lucas D. O'Brien
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Abstract

In this paper, we study the Rochet-Choné model of monopolist pricing in the seller's market limit. We introduce a monotonicity formula which yields an asymptotic description of solutions, and prove that the proportion of consumers priced out of the market vanishes as overall consumer demand increases, providing a counterpoint to Armstrong's desirability of exclusion.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@misc{obrien2026monopolist,
  title = {{Monopolist nonlinear pricing in a seller's market}},
  author = {Lucas D. O'Brien},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.24011},
  eprint = {2609.24011},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24011},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - Monopolist nonlinear pricing in a seller's market
AU  - Lucas D. O'Brien
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/21
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.24011
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24011
AB  - In this paper, we study the Rochet-Choné model of monopolist pricing in the seller's market limit. We introduce a monotonicity formula which yields an asymptotic description of solutions, and prove that the proportion of consumers priced out of the market vanishes as overall consumer demand increases, providing a counterpoint to Armstrong's desirability of exclusion.
ER  -