Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures
Abstract
Designs for international climate cooperation face a trade-off between efficiency and robustness to institutional erosion. We formalize it in a stylized coalition-formation game with two enrolment channels, a membership premium read as the value of club goods and an outsider drain, stabilized with robust control. The free-rider gap is exact within the game, measurable, and separated from the architecture-specific channels. The drain decomposes into a border channel, capped by trade law at the rent it mirrors, and a compensated world-market channel. With sufficiently strong channels the model is bistable, a remnant club and a near-universal coalition separated by a critical mass. For a proposed carbon currency, whose units are reissued each period, extinguished upon use, and enforced at the border, the minimal nucleus is thirty per cent of global emissions, ignition from an EU-China nucleus requires compensating one fifth to three fifths of the outsiders' world-market loss, the established coalition withstands two to four times the erosion admissible at ignition, and the tipping survives heterogeneity to three times the premium. Two robustness coordinates place each architecture on a map with three regimes: the carbon currency is self-igniting, the border adjustment founding-dependent, the export rebate permanent-support-dependent. A third coordinate, the coalition size up to which outsiders' border payments cover joiners' compensation, marks where the full coalition comes to rest on an internal transfer. Architectures without a drain improve efficiency within a coalition but cannot form one. Robustness governs whether cooperation forms and endures; efficiency decides how much an established coalition delivers.
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BibTeX
@misc{renn2026robustness,
title = {{Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures}},
author = {Juergen Renn},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2608.12143},
eprint = {2608.12143},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12143},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures
AU - Juergen Renn
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/17
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2608.12143
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12143
AB - Designs for international climate cooperation face a trade-off between efficiency and robustness to institutional erosion. We formalize it in a stylized coalition-formation game with two enrolment channels, a membership premium read as the value of club goods and an outsider drain, stabilized with robust control. The free-rider gap is exact within the game, measurable, and separated from the architecture-specific channels. The drain decomposes into a border channel, capped by trade law at the rent it mirrors, and a compensated world-market channel. With sufficiently strong channels the model is bistable, a remnant club and a near-universal coalition separated by a critical mass. For a proposed carbon currency, whose units are reissued each period, extinguished upon use, and enforced at the border, the minimal nucleus is thirty per cent of global emissions, ignition from an EU-China nucleus requires compensating one fifth to three fifths of the outsiders' world-market loss, the established coalition withstands two to four times the erosion admissible at ignition, and the tipping survives heterogeneity to three times the premium. Two robustness coordinates place each architecture on a map with three regimes: the carbon currency is self-igniting, the border adjustment founding-dependent, the export rebate permanent-support-dependent. A third coordinate, the coalition size up to which outsiders' border payments cover joiners' compensation, marks where the full coalition comes to rest on an internal transfer. Architectures without a drain improve efficiency within a coalition but cannot form one. Robustness governs whether cooperation forms and endures; efficiency decides how much an established coalition delivers.
ER -