CorleoneGame: A library of biological dynamic games with a companion Julia solver
Abstract
Biological agents, from regulatory modules and microbial strains to organisms and populations, act on a common environment while each responds to its own costs, benefits, and limits. A dynamic game makes such interactions explicit by assigning who controls which decision, what each participant values, and which restrictions constrain unilateral deviations. We present a library of 25 biological dynamic games with 2 to 10 players spanning molecular, cellular, organismal, and population scales and competitive, antagonistic, mutualistic, and regulatory interactions. Instances cover single seasons, cycles that return to their initial state, or episodic tasks; seven include duration choice and some players' feasible sets are coupled. For each game we provide biological motivation, an executable Julia specification with player-owned controls, objectives and restrictions, a parameter instance, and a reference open-loop generalized Nash equilibrium candidate with interpreted trajectories. The solver CorleoneGame.jl computes candidates by sequential optimal-control best responses and audits them for feasibility and profitable unilateral deviations on a coarse and a refined control grid. All 25 reference computations satisfy the audit tolerances on both grids. Using a plant--herbivore game as a running example, we show how an executable specification yields an audited reference candidate that qualitatively reproduces a published prediction, how biological hypotheses become instance variants with different candidates, and how the candidates generate synthetic data for inverse games.
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BibTeX
@misc{sager2026corleonegame,
title = {{CorleoneGame: A library of biological dynamic games with a companion Julia solver}},
author = {Sebastian Sager and Christoph Plate and Julius Martensen and Frank W. Ohl},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.06307},
eprint = {2610.06307},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06307},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - CorleoneGame: A library of biological dynamic games with a companion Julia solver
AU - Sebastian Sager
AU - Christoph Plate
AU - Julius Martensen
AU - Frank W. Ohl
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/05
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.06307
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06307
AB - Biological agents, from regulatory modules and microbial strains to organisms and populations, act on a common environment while each responds to its own costs, benefits, and limits. A dynamic game makes such interactions explicit by assigning who controls which decision, what each participant values, and which restrictions constrain unilateral deviations. We present a library of 25 biological dynamic games with 2 to 10 players spanning molecular, cellular, organismal, and population scales and competitive, antagonistic, mutualistic, and regulatory interactions. Instances cover single seasons, cycles that return to their initial state, or episodic tasks; seven include duration choice and some players' feasible sets are coupled. For each game we provide biological motivation, an executable Julia specification with player-owned controls, objectives and restrictions, a parameter instance, and a reference open-loop generalized Nash equilibrium candidate with interpreted trajectories. The solver CorleoneGame.jl computes candidates by sequential optimal-control best responses and audits them for feasibility and profitable unilateral deviations on a coarse and a refined control grid. All 25 reference computations satisfy the audit tolerances on both grids. Using a plant--herbivore game as a running example, we show how an executable specification yields an audited reference candidate that qualitatively reproduces a published prediction, how biological hypotheses become instance variants with different candidates, and how the candidates generate synthetic data for inverse games.
ER -