Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks

Abstract

We consider a fully connected gossip network of n nodes that track a binary continuous-time Markov source through a strategic sender transmitting updates under a communication budget at a rate that depends on the source state. The receivers exchange packets through gossip and decide whether to follow the sender. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and analyze it through a stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) framework. We prove that the sender's budget constraint binds at every interior optimum, reducing its problem to a one-dimensional search on the budget line. When the sender pushes its preferred state at the higher rate, the receivers gossip at the highest available rate. Gossip has no direction of its own and works against the asymmetry in the sender's policy rather than reinforcing it. We prove that an optimistic Stackelberg equilibrium exists, and that it is unique and explicitly characterized whenever a policy on the strategic half of that line is feasible at the gossip cap. Monte Carlo simulations agree with the analytical recursion.

Pricing for Information Revelation in Demand Response: A Strategic Communication Approach
Hassan Mohamad, Chao Zhang, Samson Lasaulce +4
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid29 Oct 2026PreprintCC BY 4.0Full textOptimisation & controlHAL
No information transmission through quantum channels above capacity
Hao-Chung Cheng, Marco Tomamichel
arXiv8 Sep 2026PreprintarXiv licenceFull textMathematical physics Quantum physics & quantum informationarXiv
Joint Identification, Transmission, and Sensing over State-Dependent Channels with Noiseless Feedback
Vida Gholamian, Marcel A. Mross, Roberto Ferrara +2
arXiv14 Oct 2026PreprintarXiv licenceFull textGeneral mathematicsarXiv
Modeling microbiome dynamics on social networks: how between-host transmission shapes within-host evolution
Longmei Shu, Feng Fu
arXiv1 Sep 2026PreprintCC BY 4.0Full textDynamical systems Statistical & nonlinear physicsarXiv
FedPGT: Progressive Gradient Transmission for Vehicular Federated Learning over Time-Varying Channels
Jintao Yan, Tan Chen, Yuxuan Sun +2
arXiv16 Sep 2026PreprintarXiv licenceFull textGeneral mathematicsarXiv

Cite

BibTeX RIS

BibTeX

@misc{tekez2026strategic,
  title = {{Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks}},
  author = {Emirhan Tekez and Melih Bastopcu and Sinan Gezici},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.10576},
  eprint = {2609.10576},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576},
}

RIS

TY  - UNPB
TI  - Strategic Information Transmission over Gossip Networks
AU  - Emirhan Tekez
AU  - Melih Bastopcu
AU  - Sinan Gezici
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/04
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.10576
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10576
AB  - We consider a fully connected gossip network of n nodes that track a binary continuous-time Markov source through a strategic sender transmitting updates under a communication budget at a rate that depends on the source state. The receivers exchange packets through gossip and decide whether to follow the sender. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and analyze it through a stochastic hybrid systems (SHS) framework. We prove that the sender's budget constraint binds at every interior optimum, reducing its problem to a one-dimensional search on the budget line. When the sender pushes its preferred state at the higher rate, the receivers gossip at the highest available rate. Gossip has no direction of its own and works against the asymmetry in the sender's policy rather than reinforcing it. We prove that an optimistic Stackelberg equilibrium exists, and that it is unique and explicitly characterized whenever a policy on the strategic half of that line is feasible at the gossip cap. Monte Carlo simulations agree with the analytical recursion.
ER  -

Abstract

Related

Cite