Revisiting the Aerts-Broekaert-Smets quantum model of the liar paradox
Abstract
The quantum model of the two-sentence liar paradox proposed by Aerts, Broekaert, and Smets is an early example of the use of quantum formalism to describe cognitive dynamics. Our reconstruction is primarily pedagogical in intent, but it also leads to a number of clarifications, and to some new observations, concerning the structure of the model. Rewriting the model in Dirac notation, we make explicit the distinction between truth values originating from a decision and from semantic inference, and show that the associated enlargement of the one-sentence state space corresponds to a factorization with respect to which the non-paradoxical configurations are separable while the genuine liar state is entangled. We also derive the Hamiltonian generating the four-state cyclic evolution, express it in compact operator form, and give the resulting transition probabilities in closed form. We emphasize that the liar cycle admits a unitarily equivalent representation in the four-dimensional truth-only space, where the unmeasured liar state is separable, so the dimensional enlargement is not required by the unitary part of the dynamics; it is required, however, by the measurement structure. The enlargement is also required by the dynamics as soon as revision processes are admitted, in which states with identical truth content but different origins have different successors, the origin degree of freedom then acting as a minimal form of cognitive memory. We conclude by discussing the possible relationship between the model and more general deliberative processes.
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BibTeX
@misc{bianchi2026revisiting,
title = {{Revisiting the Aerts-Broekaert-Smets quantum model of the liar paradox}},
author = {Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.09228},
eprint = {2609.09228},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09228},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Revisiting the Aerts-Broekaert-Smets quantum model of the liar paradox
AU - Massimiliano Sassoli de Bianchi
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/07
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.09228
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09228
AB - The quantum model of the two-sentence liar paradox proposed by Aerts, Broekaert, and Smets is an early example of the use of quantum formalism to describe cognitive dynamics. Our reconstruction is primarily pedagogical in intent, but it also leads to a number of clarifications, and to some new observations, concerning the structure of the model. Rewriting the model in Dirac notation, we make explicit the distinction between truth values originating from a decision and from semantic inference, and show that the associated enlargement of the one-sentence state space corresponds to a factorization with respect to which the non-paradoxical configurations are separable while the genuine liar state is entangled. We also derive the Hamiltonian generating the four-state cyclic evolution, express it in compact operator form, and give the resulting transition probabilities in closed form. We emphasize that the liar cycle admits a unitarily equivalent representation in the four-dimensional truth-only space, where the unmeasured liar state is separable, so the dimensional enlargement is not required by the unitary part of the dynamics; it is required, however, by the measurement structure. The enlargement is also required by the dynamics as soon as revision processes are admitted, in which states with identical truth content but different origins have different successors, the origin degree of freedom then acting as a minimal form of cognitive memory. We conclude by discussing the possible relationship between the model and more general deliberative processes.
ER -