Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions

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Cite

BibTeX

@misc{foscari2026trust,
  title = {{Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions}},
  author = {Luigi Foscari and Matilde Tullii and Vianney Perchet},
  howpublished = {HAL},
  year = {2026},
  month = may,
  eprint = {2605.22438},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://hal.science/hal-05830454v1},
}

RIS

TY  - UNPB
TI  - Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions
AU  - Luigi Foscari
AU  - Matilde Tullii
AU  - Vianney Perchet
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/05/21
PB  - HAL
UR  - https://hal.science/hal-05830454v1
ER  -

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