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PreprintarXiv licencearXiv

Combining Error Verification and Privacy Amplification in Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols typically involve two separate steps of error-verification and privacy amplification. Both steps involve the application of a hash function sampled from a suitable hash family to classical data. A potentially simpler alternative is to implement a single-step hashing procedure, announce and compare a fixed number of bits of its output for error-verification, and retain the remaining bits as the final output key. This reduces the complexity of classical postprocessing, the amount of classical communication, and the amount of randomness needed in the protocol. While this construction has appeared in the literature, a suitable mathematical justification is lacking. In this work, we show that the security of such protocols, under certain simple conditions, follows from a slightly modified notion of secrecy of the protocol without the final error-verification step. In particular, we show that for most entropy-based proofs, the combined protocol can be implemented with no change to the key rate, and a minor change to the security parameter.

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BibTeX
@misc{tupkary2026combining,
  title = {{Combining Error Verification and Privacy Amplification in Quantum Key Distribution}},
  author = {Devashish Tupkary and Zhiyao Wang and Ernest Y. -Z. Tan},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.10702},
  eprint = {2610.10702},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10702},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - Combining Error Verification and Privacy Amplification in Quantum Key Distribution
AU  - Devashish Tupkary
AU  - Zhiyao Wang
AU  - Ernest Y. -Z. Tan
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/07
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.10702
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10702
AB  - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols typically involve two separate steps of error-verification and privacy amplification. Both steps involve the application of a hash function sampled from a suitable hash family to classical data. A potentially simpler alternative is to implement a single-step hashing procedure, announce and compare a fixed number of bits of its output for error-verification, and retain the remaining bits as the final output key. This reduces the complexity of classical postprocessing, the amount of classical communication, and the amount of randomness needed in the protocol. While this construction has appeared in the literature, a suitable mathematical justification is lacking. In this work, we show that the security of such protocols, under certain simple conditions, follows from a slightly modified notion of secrecy of the protocol without the final error-verification step. In particular, we show that for most entropy-based proofs, the combined protocol can be implemented with no change to the key rate, and a minor change to the security parameter.
ER  -