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Peer-reviewedCC BY-NCInfection and drug resistance

Emerging Biological Threats in the Twenty-First Century: A Narrative Review Integrating One Health, Genomic Surveillance, and Laboratory Biosecurity for Pandemic Preparedness.

  1. 1Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Jamhuriya University of Science and Technology, Mogadishu, Somalia.

Abstract

The frequency of emerging infectious diseases has risen over the twenty-first century, driven by anthropogenic pressures including wildlife trade, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and climate change, which increasingly force human, animal, and environmental systems into closer proximity and create conditions favorable to zoonotic spillover. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global health infrastructure while also catalyzing advances in genomic epidemiology and medical countermeasure platforms. This narrative review synthesizes recent peer-reviewed and policy literature (see Search Strategy) on pathogen emergence, the operationalization of the One Health framework, and the intersection of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) with viral outbreaks, including the well-documented rise in empirical antibiotic use and secondary multidrug-resistant infections during acute respiratory pandemics. We also review gaps in laboratory biosecurity, including governance of Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC), the expansion of high-containment laboratories, and emerging cyberbiosecurity risks. Building on this literature, we propose an integrated preparedness framework organized around three pillars-One Health surveillance, genomic and environmental surveillance, and laboratory biosecurity and governance-with AMR and artificial intelligence (AI) treated as cross-cutting considerations, and with particular attention to the constraints facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and fragile, conflict-affected settings. We argue that strengthening global biosecurity will require decentralized genomic surveillance, sustained local laboratory capacity, and equitable international cooperation, while noting that the feasibility of these measures depends on financing, governance, and workforce constraints that are not yet fully resolved in the literature.

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BibTeX
@article{hassan2026emerging,
  title = {{Emerging Biological Threats in the Twenty-First Century: A Narrative Review Integrating One Health, Genomic Surveillance, and Laboratory Biosecurity for Pandemic Preparedness.}},
  author = {Shafie Abdulkadir Hassan and Bashir Abdirahman Guled and Abdifetah Ibrahim Omar},
  journal = {Infection and drug resistance},
  year = {2026},
  month = nov,
  doi = {10.2147/idr.s638751},
  url = {https://europepmc.org/article/MED/43011905},
  note = {CC BY-NC},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - Emerging Biological Threats in the Twenty-First Century: A Narrative Review Integrating One Health, Genomic Surveillance, and Laboratory Biosecurity for Pandemic Preparedness.
AU  - Shafie Abdulkadir Hassan
AU  - Bashir Abdirahman Guled
AU  - Abdifetah Ibrahim Omar
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/11/06
JO  - Infection and drug resistance
DO  - 10.2147/idr.s638751
UR  - https://europepmc.org/article/MED/43011905
AB  - The frequency of emerging infectious diseases has risen over the twenty-first century, driven by anthropogenic pressures including wildlife trade, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and climate change, which increasingly force human, animal, and environmental systems into closer proximity and create conditions favorable to zoonotic spillover. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global health infrastructure while also catalyzing advances in genomic epidemiology and medical countermeasure platforms. This narrative review synthesizes recent peer-reviewed and policy literature (see Search Strategy) on pathogen emergence, the operationalization of the One Health framework, and the intersection of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) with viral outbreaks, including the well-documented rise in empirical antibiotic use and secondary multidrug-resistant infections during acute respiratory pandemics. We also review gaps in laboratory biosecurity, including governance of Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC), the expansion of high-containment laboratories, and emerging cyberbiosecurity risks. Building on this literature, we propose an integrated preparedness framework organized around three pillars-One Health surveillance, genomic and environmental surveillance, and laboratory biosecurity and governance-with AMR and artificial intelligence (AI) treated as cross-cutting considerations, and with particular attention to the constraints facing low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and fragile, conflict-affected settings. We argue that strengthening global biosecurity will require decentralized genomic surveillance, sustained local laboratory capacity, and equitable international cooperation, while noting that the feasibility of these measures depends on financing, governance, and workforce constraints that are not yet fully resolved in the literature.
SN  - 1178-6973
ER  -