Skip to content
DraconiticResearch
Search Sources API
197,768 studies31 sourcesUpdated 41 min ago
Peer-reviewedCC BY 4.0PLOS Computational Biology

How does explicit reliability guide choices? Effect of trustworthiness on choice and metacognition

5 affiliations
  1. 1Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
  2. 2Department of Psychology, School of Biological and Behavioural Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom
  3. 3Institute of Health and Sport Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan
  4. 4Advanced Research Initiative for Human High Performance, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan
  5. 5Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany

Abstract

A key challenge in today’s fast-paced digital world is to integrate information from various sources, which differ in their reliability. Yet, little is known about how explicit probabilistic information about the likelihood that a source provides correct information is used in decision-making. Here, we investigated how such explicit reliability markers are integrated into decisions and the extent to which individuals have metacognitive insight into this process. We developed a novel paradigm where participants viewed predictions from sources of varying explicit reliability to help them make a choice between two options. After each decision, they rated how much they felt a given source influenced their choice. Using computational modelling, we estimated the effective reliability that participants assigned to each source. Overall, we found that participants did not take source reliability at face value, inappropriately using the stated probabilities of source correctness to make a choice. Interestingly, even sources that were explicitly labelled as unreliable biased choices, as if these were treated as moderately reliable. Additionally, the presence of sources flagged as lying ones and known to be reliably predicting the incorrect answer impaired performance by increasing leakiness in evidence accumulation. Despite these biases, participants showed some metacognitive awareness of what influenced their choices: they were aware of the impact unreliable sources had on their decisions and could evaluate how much a given source had increased the likelihood of their response. These results suggest that people distort explicit source reliability but have some awareness of this process. Author summary: In everyday life, we constantly draw on information from multiple sources that differ in how much they can be trusted. When scrolling through social media or online platforms, for instance, we know some sources are reliable, others dubious, and some clearly misleading. In this study, we created a simple task mirroring this everyday challenge to examine how people form beliefs using information from sources of known, varying reliability. Using a computational model, we uncovered two systematic ways in which decisions are biased. First, sources that were clearly identified as unreliable still influenced the beliefs and final choice of individuals. Second, people’s choices were often swayed by the last piece of information they saw, especially in a context where misleading sources were present. Surprisingly, participants were aware of some of these biases and could report which sources had shaped their choices, suggesting that awareness of bias is not necessarily sufficient to overcome it.

Related

  1. An automated pipeline for adult and developmental neuropsychological assessment of executive functions and metacognition based on a multi-layer neuropsychological digital-twin framework
    Giovanni Granato, Jordy Di Giulio, Giulia Manzi +6
    Scientific ReportsPeer-reviewedCC BY-NC-ND 4.0Full textNeuroscienceCrossref
  2. INSPECT-SR tool for assessing trustworthiness of randomised controlled trials
    Jack Wilkinson, Lisa Bero, Calvin Heal +51
    BMJ - British Medical JournalPeer-reviewedCC BYFull text4 citedGeneral biologyHAL
  3. Dissociating Accuracy and Metacognition in Nutritional Judgements
    Kelly Hoogervorst, Francesco Bavato, Ashley Tyrer +1
    PsyArXivPreprintCC BY 4.0Full textNeuroscienceOSF
  4. Agency and Embodiment Provide Dissociable Benefits to Perception, Metacognition and Neural Processing During Active Sensing
    Z. Tang, J. Dowsett, P. Taylor +2
    bioRxivPreprintCC BYFull textNeurosciencebioRxiv
  5. Performance-Metacognition Dissociation During Fear Memory Recall: Role of Task Sequence and Prefrontal TMS
    Piercesare Grimaldi, Eugenio Manassero, Paola Berchialla +1
    eneuroPeer-reviewedCC BY 4.0NeuroscienceCrossref
BibTeX
@article{ota2026does,
  title = {{How does explicit reliability guide choices? Effect of trustworthiness on choice and metacognition}},
  author = {Keiji Ota and Anthony Ciston and Patrick Haggard and Thibault Gajdos Preuss and Lucie Charles},
  journal = {PLOS Computational Biology},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818},
  url = {https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - JOUR
TI  - How does explicit reliability guide choices? Effect of trustworthiness on choice and metacognition
AU  - Keiji Ota
AU  - Anthony Ciston
AU  - Patrick Haggard
AU  - Thibault Gajdos Preuss
AU  - Lucie Charles
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/09
JO  - PLOS Computational Biology
DO  - 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818
UR  - https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1014818
AB  - A key challenge in today’s fast-paced digital world is to integrate information from various sources, which differ in their reliability. Yet, little is known about how explicit probabilistic information about the likelihood that a source provides correct information is used in decision-making. Here, we investigated how such explicit reliability markers are integrated into decisions and the extent to which individuals have metacognitive insight into this process. We developed a novel paradigm where participants viewed predictions from sources of varying explicit reliability to help them make a choice between two options. After each decision, they rated how much they felt a given source influenced their choice. Using computational modelling, we estimated the effective reliability that participants assigned to each source. Overall, we found that participants did not take source reliability at face value, inappropriately using the stated probabilities of source correctness to make a choice. Interestingly, even sources that were explicitly labelled as unreliable biased choices, as if these were treated as moderately reliable. Additionally, the presence of sources flagged as lying ones and known to be reliably predicting the incorrect answer impaired performance by increasing leakiness in evidence accumulation. Despite these biases, participants showed some metacognitive awareness of what influenced their choices: they were aware of the impact unreliable sources had on their decisions and could evaluate how much a given source had increased the likelihood of their response. These results suggest that people distort explicit source reliability but have some awareness of this process. Author summary: In everyday life, we constantly draw on information from multiple sources that differ in how much they can be trusted. When scrolling through social media or online platforms, for instance, we know some sources are reliable, others dubious, and some clearly misleading. In this study, we created a simple task mirroring this everyday challenge to examine how people form beliefs using information from sources of known, varying reliability. Using a computational model, we uncovered two systematic ways in which decisions are biased. First, sources that were clearly identified as unreliable still influenced the beliefs and final choice of individuals. Second, people’s choices were often swayed by the last piece of information they saw, especially in a context where misleading sources were present. Surprisingly, participants were aware of some of these biases and could report which sources had shaped their choices, suggesting that awareness of bias is not necessarily sufficient to overcome it.
SN  - 1553-7358
ER  -