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PreprintCC BY-NC-ND 4.0arXiv

From Biological Precursors to Artificial Cognition: Consciousness, Embodiment, and the MEM Architecture

Abstract

This article asks under what conditions artificial intelligence could warrant a rational attribution of consciousness. Linguistic ability, multimodality, memory, planning, action control, and humanoid embodiment are not sufficient evidence of phenomenal experience. Biological precursors such as excitability, homeostasis, neural networks, and hierarchical representation instead identify functions whose counterparts may be engineered. The paper compares conventional LLMs, hybrid h-LLMs, vision-language-action systems, and embodied agents with the Motivated Emotional Mind (MEM) architecture. MEM adds receptor-grounded representations, regulatory self-monitoring and interoception, affect, semblion-based associative memory, and re-entry into lower sensory and interoceptive maps. A related formulation defines a phenomenal state as a dynamic, integrated state of the whole embodied system in which sensor-grounded modal content is recurrently stabilized and coupled to a suprathreshold interoceptive representation of the system's regulatory state. The mathematical model of MEM published on arXiv specifies implementable relations among these components and makes the proposal more precise and testable. Comparative and causal tests in humans, invertebrates, and artificial systems could strengthen or weaken the MEM capabilities. MEM is therefore presented as a falsifiable research program requiring empirical validation and ethical caution.

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BibTeX
@misc{starzyk2026from,
  title = {{From Biological Precursors to Artificial Cognition: Consciousness, Embodiment, and the MEM Architecture}},
  author = {Janusz A. Starzyk and Wiesław L. Galus},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.23828},
  eprint = {2609.23828},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23828},
  note = {CC BY-NC-ND 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - From Biological Precursors to Artificial Cognition: Consciousness, Embodiment, and the MEM Architecture
AU  - Janusz A. Starzyk
AU  - Wiesław L. Galus
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/20
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.23828
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23828
AB  - This article asks under what conditions artificial intelligence could warrant a rational attribution of consciousness. Linguistic ability, multimodality, memory, planning, action control, and humanoid embodiment are not sufficient evidence of phenomenal experience. Biological precursors such as excitability, homeostasis, neural networks, and hierarchical representation instead identify functions whose counterparts may be engineered. The paper compares conventional LLMs, hybrid h-LLMs, vision-language-action systems, and embodied agents with the Motivated Emotional Mind (MEM) architecture. MEM adds receptor-grounded representations, regulatory self-monitoring and interoception, affect, semblion-based associative memory, and re-entry into lower sensory and interoceptive maps. A related formulation defines a phenomenal state as a dynamic, integrated state of the whole embodied system in which sensor-grounded modal content is recurrently stabilized and coupled to a suprathreshold interoceptive representation of the system's regulatory state. The mathematical model of MEM published on arXiv specifies implementable relations among these components and makes the proposal more precise and testable. Comparative and causal tests in humans, invertebrates, and artificial systems could strengthen or weaken the MEM capabilities. MEM is therefore presented as a falsifiable research program requiring empirical validation and ethical caution.
ER  -