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PreprintCC BY-NC-ND 4.0HAL

Infinite Time Stackelberg Game with Local Information: A Naive Solution Analysis

  • Xinwei Feng
  • Ying Hu
  • Jianhui Huang
  • Jie Peng
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Abstract

This paper considers a new class of Stackelberg games with three key features: (i) infinite time horizon; (ii) local information structure; (iii) affine constraints imposed on the leader. Within this framework, we illustrate that the naive solution is an appropriate solution class for the problem. Furthermore, we compare the naive solution with the pre-commitment solution as well as the equilibrium solutions. Under convex constraints, we rigorously derive the Lagrange multiplier and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) representations for the naive solution, and discuss the well-posedness of the problem.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@misc{feng2026infinite,
  title = {{Infinite Time Stackelberg Game with Local Information: A Naive Solution Analysis}},
  author = {Xinwei Feng and Ying Hu and Jianhui Huang and Jie Peng},
  howpublished = {HAL},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  url = {https://hal.science/hal-05750843v1},
  note = {CC BY-NC-ND 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - Infinite Time Stackelberg Game with Local Information: A Naive Solution Analysis
AU  - Xinwei Feng
AU  - Ying Hu
AU  - Jianhui Huang
AU  - Jie Peng
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/12
PB  - HAL
UR  - https://hal.science/hal-05750843v1
AB  - This paper considers a new class of Stackelberg games with three key features: (i) infinite time horizon; (ii) local information structure; (iii) affine constraints imposed on the leader. Within this framework, we illustrate that the naive solution is an appropriate solution class for the problem. Furthermore, we compare the naive solution with the pre-commitment solution as well as the equilibrium solutions. Under convex constraints, we rigorously derive the Lagrange multiplier and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) representations for the naive solution, and discuss the well-posedness of the problem.
ER  -