PreprintarXiv licencearXiv
Generic Number-of-Copies Amplification for Pseudorandom States
Abstract
We show that any quantum pseudorandom state that is secure against single-copy distinguishers, i.e. a $1$-PRS, can be amplified to t-copy security, i.e. to a t-PRS, without additional assumptions, for any polynomial t in the security parameter. Prior work (Ananth and Goldin, CRYPTO 2026) was only able to show this for a restricted class of $1$-PRS constructions, namely ones whose generators only use a small number of ancilla qubits. Technically, we show that by carefully accounting for the randomness that is used in the construction, and using quantum extractors, it is possible to eliminate an ancilla register of any length and obtain a meaningful t-PRS outcome.
Related
- Testing bosonic and fermionic Gaussian states with a constant number of copies
- Derivatives of Quantum Randomness: Separating Pseudorandom Unitaries from Pseudorandom (Function-like) States
- Operational certification of nonclassicality in arbitrary quantum states from few copies
- Genuine Multi-Entropy in Abelian Chern--Simons Theory: Exact Key-Ring Collapse and Its Breakdown for Generic Link States
- Acceleration radiation, quasinormal modes and quasi-bound states in generic rotating regular black holes
BibTeX
@misc{brakerski2026generic,
title = {{Generic Number-of-Copies Amplification for Pseudorandom States}},
author = {Zvika Brakerski and Miri Zenilman},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2606.29325},
eprint = {2606.29325},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.29325},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Generic Number-of-Copies Amplification for Pseudorandom States
AU - Zvika Brakerski
AU - Miri Zenilman
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/11/05
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2606.29325
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.29325
AB - We show that any quantum pseudorandom state that is secure against single-copy distinguishers, i.e. a $1$-PRS, can be amplified to t-copy security, i.e. to a t-PRS, without additional assumptions, for any polynomial t in the security parameter. Prior work (Ananth and Goldin, CRYPTO 2026) was only able to show this for a restricted class of $1$-PRS constructions, namely ones whose generators only use a small number of ancilla qubits. Technically, we show that by carefully accounting for the randomness that is used in the construction, and using quantum extractors, it is possible to eliminate an ancilla register of any length and obtain a meaningful t-PRS outcome.
ER -