PreprintCC BY 4.0HAL
Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots
Abstract
When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant voting rule is robust to this dependence. We show that ranked ballots change the picture sharply: a rank-based rule is robust to the presentation order if and only if it is tops-only. Robustness to anchoring is thus available, but only at the price of ignoring everything a voter reports beyond her favourite alternative.
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BibTeX
@misc{fioravanti2026anchorproofness,
title = {{Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots}},
author = {Federico Fioravanti and Zoi Terzopoulou},
howpublished = {HAL},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
eprint = {2610.10316},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://hal.science/hal-05785292v1},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots
AU - Federico Fioravanti
AU - Zoi Terzopoulou
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/07
PB - HAL
UR - https://hal.science/hal-05785292v1
AB - When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant voting rule is robust to this dependence. We show that ranked ballots change the picture sharply: a rank-based rule is robust to the presentation order if and only if it is tops-only. Robustness to anchoring is thus available, but only at the price of ignoring everything a voter reports beyond her favourite alternative.
ER -