After Theft: From Revocation to Neutralization in the Custody of Quantum Clones
Abstract
Encrypted quantum cloning enables the creation of multiple encrypted clones of an unknown quantum state while allowing only one effective decryption, with the decryption resource being intrinsically consumed in the process. In this paper, we argue that this property supports a distinctive custodial security primitive for post-compromise response. We consider a threat model in which an adversary steals an encrypted quantum clone but does not yet possess the corresponding decryption key. In such a scenario, a legitimate custodian may unseal a different trusted clone, thereby exhausting the sole available unsealing opportunity and rendering the stolen clone permanently useless. We argue that this mechanism is not adequately described as mere revocation. Rather, it realizes a stronger form of post-theft response, which we call neutralization. We formalize this distinction, locate it within a broader post-theft response space, and introduce a temporal threat model. We compare the mechanism with its closest classical analogue, showing that the classical case can reproduce the policy outcome only through external procedural composition. We finally interpret encrypted quantum cloning as a primitive for post-compromise quantum custody in distributed preservation settings, with prospective relevance for Cyber-Humanities-oriented preservation architectures.
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BibTeX
@misc{gianini2026after,
title = {{After Theft: From Revocation to Neutralization in the Custody of Quantum Clones}},
author = {Gabriele Gianini and Jianyi Lin and Corrado Mio and Stelvio Cimato and Ernesto Damiani},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.06415},
eprint = {2609.06415},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06415},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - After Theft: From Revocation to Neutralization in the Custody of Quantum Clones
AU - Gabriele Gianini
AU - Jianyi Lin
AU - Corrado Mio
AU - Stelvio Cimato
AU - Ernesto Damiani
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/06
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.06415
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06415
AB - Encrypted quantum cloning enables the creation of multiple encrypted clones of an unknown quantum state while allowing only one effective decryption, with the decryption resource being intrinsically consumed in the process. In this paper, we argue that this property supports a distinctive custodial security primitive for post-compromise response. We consider a threat model in which an adversary steals an encrypted quantum clone but does not yet possess the corresponding decryption key. In such a scenario, a legitimate custodian may unseal a different trusted clone, thereby exhausting the sole available unsealing opportunity and rendering the stolen clone permanently useless. We argue that this mechanism is not adequately described as mere revocation. Rather, it realizes a stronger form of post-theft response, which we call neutralization. We formalize this distinction, locate it within a broader post-theft response space, and introduce a temporal threat model. We compare the mechanism with its closest classical analogue, showing that the classical case can reproduce the policy outcome only through external procedural composition. We finally interpret encrypted quantum cloning as a primitive for post-compromise quantum custody in distributed preservation settings, with prospective relevance for Cyber-Humanities-oriented preservation architectures.
ER -