Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language
9 affiliations
- 1Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 2McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 3Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 4Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
- 5Department of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
- 6Department of Psychology, University of California Berkeley
- 7Department of Psychology, UC Berkeley
- 8School of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University
- 9Department of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University
Abstract
Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used non-invasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning. Significance Which cognitive mechanisms allow humans to reason logically, to understand whether a conclusion follows from the premises? Are they the same ones that allow the assembly of words into structured representations? Scholars have debated for millennia whether logical reasoning is inextricably tied to natural language, or instead relies on a distinct “language of thought” (LOT). Using fMRI in healthy adults and evaluating logical ability in individuals with severe aphasia, we find that distinct neural systems support language processing vs. logical (inductive and deductive) reasoning. These results suggest that, at least in mature brains, language processing does not underpin logical inference, perhaps due to the distinct representational format of the logical LOT.
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BibTeX
@article{kean2026evidence,
title = {{Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language}},
author = {Hope Kean and Alexander Fung and Paris Jaggers and Jason A. Chen and Joshua Rule and Yael Benn and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Steven T. Piantadosi and Rosemary A. Varley and Evelina G. Fedorenko},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
doi = {10.1073/pnas.2520095123},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2520095123},
note = {CC BY-NC-ND},
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
TI - Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language
AU - Hope Kean
AU - Alexander Fung
AU - Paris Jaggers
AU - Jason A. Chen
AU - Joshua Rule
AU - Yael Benn
AU - Joshua B. Tenenbaum
AU - Steven T. Piantadosi
AU - Rosemary A. Varley
AU - Evelina G. Fedorenko
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/07/06
JO - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DO - 10.1073/pnas.2520095123
UR - https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2520095123
AB - Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used non-invasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning. Significance Which cognitive mechanisms allow humans to reason logically, to understand whether a conclusion follows from the premises? Are they the same ones that allow the assembly of words into structured representations? Scholars have debated for millennia whether logical reasoning is inextricably tied to natural language, or instead relies on a distinct “language of thought” (LOT). Using fMRI in healthy adults and evaluating logical ability in individuals with severe aphasia, we find that distinct neural systems support language processing vs. logical (inductive and deductive) reasoning. These results suggest that, at least in mature brains, language processing does not underpin logical inference, perhaps due to the distinct representational format of the logical LOT.
SN - 0027-8424
SN - 1091-6490
ER -