Propositional and imagistic incongruity: a dual-route cognitive account of humor processing
- 1School of Foreign Languages, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
- 2Department of Educational Psychology, University of Education Weingarten, Weingarten, Germany
- 3Institute for Innovative Teaching and Applied Teaching and Learning Research, University of Applied Sciences Ravensburg-Weingarten, Weingarten, Germany
Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical account of humor processing in terms of two interacting routes of cognitive processing. Building on the distinction between propositional and imagistic modes of language comprehension, it argues that humorous incongruity may arise through conceptual, perceptual, or cross-representational discrepancies. The propositional route involves relatively abstract and amodal representations, in which humor emerges from a mismatch between conceptual expectations and asserted or implied meanings. The imagistic route involves mental imagery, perceptual simulation, and sensorimotor representation, in which humor emerges from discrepancies between expected and activated perceptual or multimodal representations. In addition, the paper proposes that humorous effects may arise through between-route incongruity, where propositional and imagistic representations conflict, as in cases where verbal content and gesture, visual imagery, or embodied cues convey incompatible meanings. This dual-route account is not intended to replace existing theories of humor, but to specify a processing-level distinction that clarifies how incongruity is represented and resolved across verbal, visual, and multimodal forms of humor. By linking humor processing to conceptual processing, mental imagery, and embodied cognition, the account provides a framework for explaining why formally similar humorous expressions may differ in cognitive demands, perceptual salience, and affective impact. The paper concludes by outlining implications for future behavioral, cognitive, and multimodal research on humor processing.
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BibTeX
@article{khatinzadeh2026propositional,
title = {{Propositional and imagistic incongruity: a dual-route cognitive account of humor processing}},
author = {Omid Khatin-Zadeh and Hassan Banaruee},
journal = {Cognitive Processing},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.1007/s10339-026-01398-6},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-026-01398-6},
note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
TI - Propositional and imagistic incongruity: a dual-route cognitive account of humor processing
AU - Omid Khatin-Zadeh
AU - Hassan Banaruee
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/25
JO - Cognitive Processing
DO - 10.1007/s10339-026-01398-6
UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-026-01398-6
AB - This paper develops a theoretical account of humor processing in terms of two interacting routes of cognitive processing. Building on the distinction between propositional and imagistic modes of language comprehension, it argues that humorous incongruity may arise through conceptual, perceptual, or cross-representational discrepancies. The propositional route involves relatively abstract and amodal representations, in which humor emerges from a mismatch between conceptual expectations and asserted or implied meanings. The imagistic route involves mental imagery, perceptual simulation, and sensorimotor representation, in which humor emerges from discrepancies between expected and activated perceptual or multimodal representations. In addition, the paper proposes that humorous effects may arise through between-route incongruity, where propositional and imagistic representations conflict, as in cases where verbal content and gesture, visual imagery, or embodied cues convey incompatible meanings. This dual-route account is not intended to replace existing theories of humor, but to specify a processing-level distinction that clarifies how incongruity is represented and resolved across verbal, visual, and multimodal forms of humor. By linking humor processing to conceptual processing, mental imagery, and embodied cognition, the account provides a framework for explaining why formally similar humorous expressions may differ in cognitive demands, perceptual salience, and affective impact. The paper concludes by outlining implications for future behavioral, cognitive, and multimodal research on humor processing.
SN - 1612-4782
SN - 1612-4790
ER -