Tripartite System Dynamics of Cooperation Ecological Resources and Adaptive Regulation
Abstract
To address commons dilemmas under costly social cooperation, this paper develops a tripartite coevolutionary system that integrates social behavior, ecological resource dynamics, and institutional regulation. Institutional intervention is modeled as an adaptive feedback mechanism whose intensity responds to deviations from prescribed cooperation and ecological targets. Through equilibrium analysis, stability analysis, and phase space characterization, we identify the principal operating regimes and transition mechanisms of the coupled system. The results show that the system admits a sustainable operating equilibrium in which cooperation, ecological resources, and institutional regulation coexist. We further establish the structural stability of a desirable operating state characterized by full cooperation, peak resource availability, and persistently minimal intervention. In addition to these stable regimes, the system exhibits bistability and limit cycles, indicating that alternative long term outcomes may arise from different initial conditions and parameter configurations. These nonlinear mechanisms generate a persistent crackdown rebound policy trap, in which intensified intervention temporarily improves cooperation and resource conditions but eventually produces recurrent oscillations and prevents system wide consensus. The proposed framework provides a system level explanation of governance failure and offers analytical insights for designing adaptive institutional regulation in coupled human environment systems.
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BibTeX
@misc{liu2026tripartite,
title = {{Tripartite System Dynamics of Cooperation Ecological Resources and Adaptive Regulation}},
author = {Linjie Liu and Yike Li and Shijia Hua},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.37333},
eprint = {2609.37333},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37333},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Tripartite System Dynamics of Cooperation Ecological Resources and Adaptive Regulation
AU - Linjie Liu
AU - Yike Li
AU - Shijia Hua
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/29
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.37333
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37333
AB - To address commons dilemmas under costly social cooperation, this paper develops a tripartite coevolutionary system that integrates social behavior, ecological resource dynamics, and institutional regulation. Institutional intervention is modeled as an adaptive feedback mechanism whose intensity responds to deviations from prescribed cooperation and ecological targets. Through equilibrium analysis, stability analysis, and phase space characterization, we identify the principal operating regimes and transition mechanisms of the coupled system. The results show that the system admits a sustainable operating equilibrium in which cooperation, ecological resources, and institutional regulation coexist. We further establish the structural stability of a desirable operating state characterized by full cooperation, peak resource availability, and persistently minimal intervention. In addition to these stable regimes, the system exhibits bistability and limit cycles, indicating that alternative long term outcomes may arise from different initial conditions and parameter configurations. These nonlinear mechanisms generate a persistent crackdown rebound policy trap, in which intensified intervention temporarily improves cooperation and resource conditions but eventually produces recurrent oscillations and prevents system wide consensus. The proposed framework provides a system level explanation of governance failure and offers analytical insights for designing adaptive institutional regulation in coupled human environment systems.
ER -