Inverse Learning of the Altruism and Cost Level in Mixed-Individual Mean Field Games
Abstract
Understanding how humans respond to incentives, both at the individual and collective levels, is crucial to the design of effective policies. Within the continuous-time stochastic framework for large interacting populations, mean field games (MFGs) model populations of non-cooperative agents, whereas mean field control (MFC) describes the fully cooperative benchmark, interpreted in our setting as fully altruistic behavior. Mixed-individual MFGs interpolate between these two extremes through a parameter governing the degree of altruism. A central challenge for regulators and policymakers, however, is that intrinsic altruism levels and other private structural parameters, such as individual labor costs, are typically unobservable. To address this challenge, we develop an inverse learning framework for mixed-individual MFGs. Our approach enables the recovery of (latent) altruism and labor cost levels from noisy observations, with experiments demonstrating the feasibility and accuracy of our method. These findings underscore the promise of inverse MFG methodologies for uncovering latent preference structures in large populations, with important implications for incentive design, empirical behavioral modeling, and data-driven policy analysis.
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BibTeX
@misc{cao2026inverse,
title = {{Inverse Learning of the Altruism and Cost Level in Mixed-Individual Mean Field Games}},
author = {Haoyang Cao and Gökçe Dayanıklı and Xiaofei Shi},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.13469},
eprint = {2609.13469},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13469},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Inverse Learning of the Altruism and Cost Level in Mixed-Individual Mean Field Games
AU - Haoyang Cao
AU - Gökçe Dayanıklı
AU - Xiaofei Shi
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/11
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.13469
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13469
AB - Understanding how humans respond to incentives, both at the individual and collective levels, is crucial to the design of effective policies. Within the continuous-time stochastic framework for large interacting populations, mean field games (MFGs) model populations of non-cooperative agents, whereas mean field control (MFC) describes the fully cooperative benchmark, interpreted in our setting as fully altruistic behavior. Mixed-individual MFGs interpolate between these two extremes through a parameter governing the degree of altruism. A central challenge for regulators and policymakers, however, is that intrinsic altruism levels and other private structural parameters, such as individual labor costs, are typically unobservable. To address this challenge, we develop an inverse learning framework for mixed-individual MFGs. Our approach enables the recovery of (latent) altruism and labor cost levels from noisy observations, with experiments demonstrating the feasibility and accuracy of our method. These findings underscore the promise of inverse MFG methodologies for uncovering latent preference structures in large populations, with important implications for incentive design, empirical behavioral modeling, and data-driven policy analysis.
ER -