Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Side-Channel Countermeasures
Abstract
Formal verification of power side-channel leakage and its countermeasures in cryptographic algorithms is challenging, as SAT-based methods fail to scale on XOR-heavy, time-unrolled cryptographic circuits with realistic leakage models. We construct compact Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) cases modeling one-bit leakage under two-trace conditions, linking key dependence and state evolution. Classical solvers quickly reach complexity limits, so we propose Q-LEAK, a quantum-based verification approach using Grover's algorithm, compiling each CNF into an oracle and applying amplitude amplification to search in O(sqrt(N)) oracle calls, with oracles that encode the two-trace leakage predicate and the CNF constraints. Benchmarking against classical SAT shows both potential gains and practical resource limits. In noiseless tests on 5-7 variable benchmarks, Q-LEAK consistently recovered a satisfying assignment within 1-4 tries, with marked bitstrings amplified clearly above the background distribution, exceeding 20 percent probability. The evaluation of Q-LEAK on real quantum hardware revealed at least one classically verified SAT assignment, despite the presence of noise. These results point to a potential path toward quantum-assisted verification of side-channel protections.
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BibTeX
@misc{maouaki2026qleak,
title = {{Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Side-Channel Countermeasures}},
author = {Walid El Maouaki and Alberto Marchisio and Muhammad Shafique},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2605.25728},
eprint = {2605.25728},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25728},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Q-LEAK: Quantum-Based LEAKage Verification for Side-Channel Countermeasures
AU - Walid El Maouaki
AU - Alberto Marchisio
AU - Muhammad Shafique
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/03
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2605.25728
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25728
AB - Formal verification of power side-channel leakage and its countermeasures in cryptographic algorithms is challenging, as SAT-based methods fail to scale on XOR-heavy, time-unrolled cryptographic circuits with realistic leakage models. We construct compact Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) cases modeling one-bit leakage under two-trace conditions, linking key dependence and state evolution. Classical solvers quickly reach complexity limits, so we propose Q-LEAK, a quantum-based verification approach using Grover's algorithm, compiling each CNF into an oracle and applying amplitude amplification to search in O(sqrt(N)) oracle calls, with oracles that encode the two-trace leakage predicate and the CNF constraints. Benchmarking against classical SAT shows both potential gains and practical resource limits. In noiseless tests on 5-7 variable benchmarks, Q-LEAK consistently recovered a satisfying assignment within 1-4 tries, with marked bitstrings amplified clearly above the background distribution, exceeding 20 percent probability. The evaluation of Q-LEAK on real quantum hardware revealed at least one classically verified SAT assignment, despite the presence of noise. These results point to a potential path toward quantum-assisted verification of side-channel protections.
ER -