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Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in structured populations: Network degree governs evolutionary stability
Abstract
Stochasticity shapes evolutionary dynamics in finite populations beyond the reach of infinite-population theories. Using a stochastic birth--death framework on random regular networks, we establish evolutionary stability criteria for finite structured populations playing three-strategy games and identify critical degree thresholds governing invasion dynamics. Our framework goes beyond two-strategy evolutionary games to reveal that the initial composition of multi-type mutants, together with population structure and stochasticity, shapes the evolutionary fate of the resident population.
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BibTeX
@misc{dubey2026stochastic,
title = {{Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in structured populations: Network degree governs evolutionary stability}},
author = {Vikash Kumar Dubey and Sagar Chakraborty},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.05857},
eprint = {2610.05857},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05857},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in structured populations: Network degree governs evolutionary stability
AU - Vikash Kumar Dubey
AU - Sagar Chakraborty
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/05
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.05857
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05857
AB - Stochasticity shapes evolutionary dynamics in finite populations beyond the reach of infinite-population theories. Using a stochastic birth--death framework on random regular networks, we establish evolutionary stability criteria for finite structured populations playing three-strategy games and identify critical degree thresholds governing invasion dynamics. Our framework goes beyond two-strategy evolutionary games to reveal that the initial composition of multi-type mutants, together with population structure and stochasticity, shapes the evolutionary fate of the resident population.
ER -