A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities
Abstract
This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretical framework for the financial settlement of real-time deviations in Community-Based Local Energy Markets (CB-LEMs). The real-time settlement process is modeled as a transferable-utility cooperative game, and the resulting Real-Time Local Energy Market (RTLEM) game is shown to be superadditive and balanced. We analyze two game-theoretical allocation mechanisms, the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and evaluate their efficiency, individual rationality, coalitional rationality, and temporal-aggregation properties. We subsequently compare these mechanisms with a settlement rule based on proportional imbalance responsibility. The three mechanisms are efficient and individually rational, but only the nucleolus is guaranteed to satisfy coalitional rationality for every RTLEM instance. The proposed framework is demonstrated using real-world data from a residential energy community in Amsterdam, showing the trade-offs among the three allocation mechanisms in terms of surplus distribution, coalitional stability, interpretability, and computational requirements.
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BibTeX
@misc{gonzalezrueda2026cooperative,
title = {{A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities}},
author = {Angel M. González-Rueda and Iago Núñez Lugilde and Jose L. Crespo-Vazquez and Tarek Alskaif},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2611.03030},
eprint = {2611.03030},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - A Cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Real-Time Deviation Settlement in Local Energy Communities
AU - Angel M. González-Rueda
AU - Iago Núñez Lugilde
AU - Jose L. Crespo-Vazquez
AU - Tarek Alskaif
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/11/02
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2611.03030
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03030
AB - This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretical framework for the financial settlement of real-time deviations in Community-Based Local Energy Markets (CB-LEMs). The real-time settlement process is modeled as a transferable-utility cooperative game, and the resulting Real-Time Local Energy Market (RTLEM) game is shown to be superadditive and balanced. We analyze two game-theoretical allocation mechanisms, the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and evaluate their efficiency, individual rationality, coalitional rationality, and temporal-aggregation properties. We subsequently compare these mechanisms with a settlement rule based on proportional imbalance responsibility. The three mechanisms are efficient and individually rational, but only the nucleolus is guaranteed to satisfy coalitional rationality for every RTLEM instance. The proposed framework is demonstrated using real-world data from a residential energy community in Amsterdam, showing the trade-offs among the three allocation mechanisms in terms of surplus distribution, coalitional stability, interpretability, and computational requirements.
ER -