Peer-reviewedLicence not statedJournal of Public Economics
How do bureaucrats respond to hybrid incentive contract? Evidence from China’s air pollution controls
- 1School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing, China
- 2Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, China
- 3Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
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BibTeX
@article{cao2026bureaucrats,
title = {{How do bureaucrats respond to hybrid incentive contract? Evidence from China’s air pollution controls}},
author = {Guangyu Cao and Xi Weng and Mei‐Yan Xu and Lian Zhou},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
year = {2026},
month = may,
doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105664},
url = {http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4884245},
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
TI - How do bureaucrats respond to hybrid incentive contract? Evidence from China’s air pollution controls
AU - Guangyu Cao
AU - Xi Weng
AU - Mei‐Yan Xu
AU - Lian Zhou
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/05/14
JO - Journal of Public Economics
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105664
UR - http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4884245
SN - 0047-2727
SN - 1879-2316
ER -