Security of quantum key distribution with passive basis choice and detection-efficiency mismatch for a realistic satellite setup
Abstract
Detection efficiency mismatch is a common problem in realistic quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Existing security proofs for passive basis choice provide a nonzero secret key rate for small detection efficiency mismatches only. Unfortunately, in realistic setups, the detection efficiency mismatch can be significant. Here, we present a different approach for estimating the secret key rate for the BB84 protocol with passive basis choice and a detection efficiency mismatch between four threshold detectors, where the mismatch is not assumed to be small. We also adapt the decoy-state method for this case. The suggested approach is used to estimate the secret key rate in a QKD experiment between the Micius satellite and the Zvenigorod ground station.
Versions
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BibTeX
@misc{ivchenko2026security,
title = {{Security of quantum key distribution with passive basis choice and detection-efficiency mismatch for a realistic satellite setup}},
author = {Egor Ivchenko and Aleksandr Khmelev and Vladimir Kurochkin and Anton Trushechkin},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = nov,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2608.09793},
eprint = {2608.09793},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09793},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Security of quantum key distribution with passive basis choice and detection-efficiency mismatch for a realistic satellite setup
AU - Egor Ivchenko
AU - Aleksandr Khmelev
AU - Vladimir Kurochkin
AU - Anton Trushechkin
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/11/05
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2608.09793
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09793
AB - Detection efficiency mismatch is a common problem in realistic quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Existing security proofs for passive basis choice provide a nonzero secret key rate for small detection efficiency mismatches only. Unfortunately, in realistic setups, the detection efficiency mismatch can be significant. Here, we present a different approach for estimating the secret key rate for the BB84 protocol with passive basis choice and a detection efficiency mismatch between four threshold detectors, where the mismatch is not assumed to be small. We also adapt the decoy-state method for this case. The suggested approach is used to estimate the secret key rate in a QKD experiment between the Micius satellite and the Zvenigorod ground station.
ER -