Security framework for practical quantum key distribution with imperfect devices

@misc{wiesemann2026security,
  title = {{Security framework for practical quantum key distribution with imperfect devices}},
  author = {Jerome Wiesemann and John Burniston and Devashish Tupkary and Norbert Lütkenhaus},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.15790},
  eprint = {2609.15790},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15790},
}

TY  - UNPB
TI  - Security framework for practical quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
AU  - Jerome Wiesemann
AU  - John Burniston
AU  - Devashish Tupkary
AU  - Norbert Lütkenhaus
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/09/14
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.15790
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15790
AB  - Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems inevitably exhibit imperfections in both the source and detector. At the same time, the behavior of these imperfect devices is never exactly known due to characterization uncertainty, parameter fluctuations, and potential influence by an adversary. In this work, we present a security proof for generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, including decoy-state BB84, with imperfect and imperfectly characterized sources and detectors using the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (MEAT). Our approach uses a sequence of proof technique independent source maps and squashing maps, yielding a very modular framework. We show that practical key rates can be achieved even when multiple imperfections are combined. More broadly, our work provides a unified foundation that avoids the need for dedicated protocol-specific arguments and can be readily extended to other protocols and device imperfections.
ER  -