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PreprintCC BY 4.0arXiv

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment

  • Mikio Fujiwara
  • Katsumi Fujii
  • Fumie Ono
  • Masakazu Ono
  • Akihisa Tomita
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Abstract

Actual quantum key distribution network nodes may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as electromagnetic leakage. In this study, we measured electromagnetic emissions from a prototype quantum key distribution device implementing a time-bin decoy-state BB84 protocol with Y and Z bases. We measured the electromagnetic spectra and waveforms at distances of 0 m and 3 m from the transmitter and receiver inside an anechoic chamber. The results showed that the transmitter was the primary source of electromagnetic leakage, and distinct differences were observed between the quantum states generated at the third harmonic of the 1241.6 MHz clock.

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Cite

BibTeXRIS
BibTeX
@misc{fujiwara2026electromagnetic,
  title = {{Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment}},
  author = {Mikio Fujiwara and Katsumi Fujii and Fumie Ono and Masakazu Ono and Akihisa Tomita},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.01609},
  eprint = {2610.01609},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01609},
  note = {CC BY 4.0},
}
RIS
TY  - UNPB
TI  - Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment
AU  - Mikio Fujiwara
AU  - Katsumi Fujii
AU  - Fumie Ono
AU  - Masakazu Ono
AU  - Akihisa Tomita
PY  - 2026
DA  - 2026/10/01
PB  - arXiv
DO  - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.01609
UR  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01609
AB  - Actual quantum key distribution network nodes may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as electromagnetic leakage. In this study, we measured electromagnetic emissions from a prototype quantum key distribution device implementing a time-bin decoy-state BB84 protocol with Y and Z bases. We measured the electromagnetic spectra and waveforms at distances of 0 m and 3 m from the transmitter and receiver inside an anechoic chamber. The results showed that the transmitter was the primary source of electromagnetic leakage, and distinct differences were observed between the quantum states generated at the third harmonic of the 1241.6 MHz clock.
ER  -