Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks
Abstract
We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of long quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field, where the effective key length after one signature exposure is the residual dimension r=n−ℓ. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classical signature and may jointly process N public-key copies, while verification uses one additional independent copy. We show that, conditioned on the exposed signature, the security problem reduces to a partial-prediction game for a uniform stabilizer ensemble on these r residual qudits, with a partial query along d=rank(Y−Y') directions, where Y and Y' denote the honestly signed and target-forged messages, respectively. Surprisingly, although the target requires only partial information, there is no first-order reduction in the required copy rate when d/r→β∈(0,1]. The optimal average forgery probability for the specified target tends to zero for N/r→α<1 and to one for α>1, revealing a sharp threshold at α=1. Thus, long stabilizer public keys resist finite-copy forgery attacks under a single-signature-exposure model whenever the adversarial copy rate remains below one.
Related
- Optical image encryption and information hiding with computational ghost imaging based on a forgery attack mechanism
- Development and characterization of a chemically amplified positive-tone hybrid resist for thick-film microfabrication
- Beyond 11/16: dense Kuramoto networks that resist synchrony
- Hybrid Authentication Protocols for Advanced Quantum Networks
- Security authentication and 3D tracking of unmanned autonomous vehicles with optical ID tags
BibTeX
@misc{hayashi2026stabilizerpublickey,
title = {{Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks}},
author = {Masahito Hayashi and Jingtian Zhao and Baichu Yu},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = sep,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2609.20877},
eprint = {2609.20877},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - Stabilizer-Public-Key Authentication: Long Stabilizer Public Keys Resist Finite-Copy Forgery Attacks
AU - Masahito Hayashi
AU - Jingtian Zhao
AU - Baichu Yu
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/09/22
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2609.20877
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20877
AB - We propose an information-theoretic authentication protocol based on a finite supply of long quadratic-stabilizer public-key states over an odd-prime field, where the effective key length after one signature exposure is the residual dimension r=n−ℓ. A computationally unbounded adversary observes one valid classical signature and may jointly process N public-key copies, while verification uses one additional independent copy. We show that, conditioned on the exposed signature, the security problem reduces to a partial-prediction game for a uniform stabilizer ensemble on these r residual qudits, with a partial query along d=rank(Y−Y') directions, where Y and Y' denote the honestly signed and target-forged messages, respectively. Surprisingly, although the target requires only partial information, there is no first-order reduction in the required copy rate when d/r→β∈(0,1]. The optimal average forgery probability for the specified target tends to zero for N/r→α<1 and to one for α>1, revealing a sharp threshold at α=1. Thus, long stabilizer public keys resist finite-copy forgery attacks under a single-signature-exposure model whenever the adversarial copy rate remains below one.
ER -