String-averaging bargaining in solidarity cooperative games
Abstract
We consider the situation that the grand set of all players, in a cooperative game in characteristic function form with a nonempty core, consists of recognizable subsets of players. The underlying assumption is that the players of each subset have something in common between themselves which is not shared by the players of other subsets. For example, the members of these subsets are distinguishable by their nationalities or by their geographic locations or by some other market-related economic or social property. In addition to the agreement of all players to play the game to reach a point in the core, the members of each subset want to steer the iterative orbit of the bargaining process to a point in the core that will reflect the strength of their solidarity within their subset. This is why we call such subsets solidarity sets. The solidarity means that players of a solidarity set are willing to participate in coalitions that include only members of their solidarity set and are not willing to participate in coalitions of other solidarity sets. The question is how can such a game be played? Is there an iterative bargaining scheme that will generate a sequence of payoffs that converges to a point in the core which reflects the solidarity of the members of the solidarity sets? We propose bargaining schemes that allow the members of each solidarity set to perform, independently from other solidarity sets and, therefore, simultaneously in time, a full but finite sweep of intercoalitional collaboration. Then the end-points of all these sweeps are combined into a single payoff vector via a convex combination wherein the coefficients of the convex combination may reflect some a priori knowledge about the relative strengths of the different solidarity sets. These bargaining schemes are applied to a new type of cooperative game that we call solidarity cooperative game (SCG).
Related
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BibTeX
@misc{censor2026stringaveraging,
title = {{String-averaging bargaining in solidarity cooperative games}},
author = {Yair Censor and Soumitra Dey},
howpublished = {arXiv},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2610.41062},
eprint = {2610.41062},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41062},
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
TI - String-averaging bargaining in solidarity cooperative games
AU - Yair Censor
AU - Soumitra Dey
PY - 2026
DA - 2026/10/29
PB - arXiv
DO - 10.48550/arxiv.2610.41062
UR - https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41062
AB - We consider the situation that the grand set of all players, in a cooperative game in characteristic function form with a nonempty core, consists of recognizable subsets of players. The underlying assumption is that the players of each subset have something in common between themselves which is not shared by the players of other subsets. For example, the members of these subsets are distinguishable by their nationalities or by their geographic locations or by some other market-related economic or social property. In addition to the agreement of all players to play the game to reach a point in the core, the members of each subset want to steer the iterative orbit of the bargaining process to a point in the core that will reflect the strength of their solidarity within their subset. This is why we call such subsets solidarity sets. The solidarity means that players of a solidarity set are willing to participate in coalitions that include only members of their solidarity set and are not willing to participate in coalitions of other solidarity sets. The question is how can such a game be played? Is there an iterative bargaining scheme that will generate a sequence of payoffs that converges to a point in the core which reflects the solidarity of the members of the solidarity sets? We propose bargaining schemes that allow the members of each solidarity set to perform, independently from other solidarity sets and, therefore, simultaneously in time, a full but finite sweep of intercoalitional collaboration. Then the end-points of all these sweeps are combined into a single payoff vector via a convex combination wherein the coefficients of the convex combination may reflect some a priori knowledge about the relative strengths of the different solidarity sets. These bargaining schemes are applied to a new type of cooperative game that we call solidarity cooperative game (SCG).
ER -